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the issue of religion and state was handled in Israel according to the
doctrine of status quo. As a result of this policy, matters of religion
and state have changed little from the time the State of Israel was
established. Underlying the status quo doctrine-viewed as an
informal 'gag rule'-was the perception that it served as a necessary
condition for the emergence, maintenance and stability of democracy
in Israel. Yet on many occasions over the past several years, once-
latent disagreements over matters of religion and state have become a
major source of political and cultural tensions in Israeli society.
Drawing on political and constitutional theory, this essay
advocates that Israel abandon the status quo doctrine and in its stead
adopt an entrenched, formal gag rule. Although concerned with gag
rules in Israel, this paper has broader relevance: it analyzes and
evaluates various types of gag rules, and thus may contribute to a
better understanding of the effectiveness of gag rules, especially in
the form of constitutions, and the specific conditions required to
secure their effectiveness.
The first part of this essay addresses a preliminary question: Is it
wise to open this issue to discussion at all? Some Israelis, most of
them Orthodox, believe that the best way to handle problems of
religion and state in Israel is to strictly preserve the status quo and not
to open it to reevaluation. I intend to demonstrate why reevaluating
religion and state in Israel is essential. I will even suggest that it is in
the interest of the Jewish Orthodoxy to support the reevaluation of
this issue.
One of the major obstacles to reevaluating the, status quo
doctrine is the concern of the Orthodox leadership that substantive
reevaluation will also involve a shift in power. They do not oppose a
reevaluation of the issue as much as they resent the idea that judges,
whom they do not trust, will be empowered to interpret and enforce
the arrangement. It is possible that a reevaluation of the status quo
doctrine will result in constitutional entrenchment of the new
arrangement. The second part of this essay focuses, therefore, on the
question of whether the issue of religion and state should be framed
as a constitutional question. I hope to illustrate why
constitutionalizing the issue of religion-state better serves the
interests of all sides of the dispute-including the Orthodox camp-
and to describe the conditions necessary to make it work. This essay
will also illustrate how Israeli legislators and judges ignore the
necessity of these conditions.
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H. Why Israel Should Reevaluate the Issue of Religion & State
A. The Status Quo-Origins, Contents, and Justification
1. Origins
As already noted, the status quo is the basic formula for conflict
resolution in matters of religion and state that has prevailed in Israel
since its establishment and throughout the past 50 years. At the time
of its establishment and during the first years of statehood, Israel
incorporated and crystallized arrangements that originated from two
sources. First, it incorporated legal arrangements that prevailed in
Palestine prior to the establishment of the state, first during the
period of the Ottoman rule and then under the British mandate.!
Second, Israel incorporated resolutions that were passed and
implemented prior to the establishment of the state by some Zionist
institutions. The status quo doctrine is the outcome of this
incorporation and crystallization.3
1. It is customary to relate the first political understanding respecting the status
quo to a letter, dated June 1947, which was sent by the leaders of the Jewish Agency,
the pre-state Israeli government, to the non-Zionist Orthodox "Agudat Israel"
group, in the hope that Jewish leaders could speak with one voice to the UN
committee (UNSCOP) that was sent to check the situation in Palestine. The letter,
which contained several promises respecting religion and state, fulfilled its goal, as
Agudat Israel, contrary to its official position for many years, did not express
opposition to the idea of creating the State of Israel. See ToM SEGEV, 1949: THiE
FIRST ISRAELIs 249-51 (1986). The full version of the letter (in Hebrew) can be found
in THE REGIME OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, 559-60 (Y. Galnur ed., 1984). It should be
noted, however, that this letter included much less than what was finally agreed upon
in the formative years of the State. See Menachem Friedman, VeEle Toldot haStatus
Quo: Dat uMedinab BeYisrael [And These are the Origins of the Status Quo:
Religion and State in Israel] in HAMAAVAR MEYISHUV LEMEDINAH 194749:
RETSIFUT UTMUROT [The Transition From a Settlement to a State 194749:
Continuity and Changes] 47 (V. Pilovsky ed., 1988).
2. The Ottoman Empire's "Millet' system allowed recognized religious
communities to maintain an autonomous judicial system and follow their religious
laws in matters of religious status. The British empire left this arrangement intact
(see The Palestine Order in Council (1922-47), Paragraph 83, III Laws of Palestine
2569 (1934)), and the State of Israel made very minor modifications to this
arrangement, mainly related to the fact that after the establishment of the state Jews
were no longer a minority religious community. For a general description of the
Millet system, see Amnon Rubinstein, Law and Religion in Israel, 2 IsR. L. REv. 3S0,
384-99 (1967).
3. For a general description of the status quo and its political history see
CHARLES S. LIEBMAN & ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL,
ch. 3 (1984) [hereinafter LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN
ISRAEL]; Eliezer Don-Yehiya, The Resolution of Religious Conflicts in Israel in
1999]
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2. Contents
Several reasons make it hard to clearly define the status quo.
First, the status quo doctrine does not contain a set of principles, but
rather a collection of arrangements concerning various issues having
to do with the relationship between religion and state. In practice the
contents of the status quo are not strictly coherent. In addition, there
is no official agreement regarding the scope of these status quo
arrangements for two reasons. First, some of these arrangements are
informal. Second, the formal legislative arrangements tend to
provide only a general framework, with details to be resolved in the
future; however, these details have not been unanimously agreed
upon. Finally, the status quo is not a permanent resolution. The
doctrine has undergone significant change through the years, which
makes it hard to describe its current form exactly. With these
constraints in mind, I will describe in general terms the contents of
the status quo.
First, the status quo incorporates an understanding of the legal
status of religious courts and their exclusive jurisdiction over matters
of personal status. Israel allows all religious communities, including
Muslim, Christian, and Druze,4 to maintain autonomous,' judicial
CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN JEWISH POLITICAL LIFE 203 (Cohen & Don-Yehiya
eds., 1986) [hereinafter DON-YEHIYA, RESOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS];
CLAUDE KLEIN, LE SYSTEME POLITIQUE D'ISRAEL 189-202 (1983); Nathan Zucker,
Secularization Conflicts in Israel, in RELIGION AND POLITICAL MODERNIZATION 95
(Donald E. Smith ed., 1974).
4. The jurisdiction of the Muslim and Christian religious courts, in matters of
personal status, as defined in Art. 51 of the Palestine Order-in-Council, 3 Laws of
Palestine 2581, is set by Arts. 52 (Muslim) and 54 (Christian) of tl-e Order. The
Druze religious courts are established under the Druze religious Courts Law, 17 Laws
of the State of Israel [L.S.I.] 27 (1962). For more details about the jurisdiction of the
various religious courts in Israel see Andrew Treitel, Conflicting Traditions: Muslim
Shari'a Courts and Marriage Age Regulation in Israel, 26 COLUM. H. R. L. REV. 402,
411-21 (1995); SHIMON SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF THE ISRAELI
JUDICIARY 106 (1994).
5. The Dayanim, Jewish religious judges, before taking their seats, have to
swear allegiance only to the state of Israel and not to the laws of the state. However,
the Courts Law 1957, section 7, authorizes the Supreme Court, while sitting as the
High Court of Justice, to intervene in the decision of religious courts in a case in
which they go beyond their jurisdiction. In addition, the High Court of justice
exercises general supervision-over all courts, including religious courts-regarding
the application of the rules of "natural justice." See IZHAK ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS
LAW AND THE ISRAELI LEGAL SYSTEM 161-68 (1975). In addition, throughout the
years the Supreme Court consistently narrowed the jurisdiction and substantive
powers of the Rabbinical Courts. For recent decisions in that direction, see Bavli v.
The Grand Rabbinical Court, 48(2) Piskei Din (P.D.) 6 (1994) (The High Court of
[Vol. 22:617
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institutions and follow their own laws in matters of personal status,
which are then binding on all members of the community. With
respect to the Jewish denomination, the religious courts, known as the
Rabbinical Courts, are an integral part of the state's judicial system,
supported by state funds, and retain exclusive jurisdiction over
matters of marriages and divorces. Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction
(Marriage and Divorce) Law' provides that "matters of marriage and
divorce of Jews in Israel, being nationals or residents of the state,
shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of rabbinical courts" and that
"marriages and divorces of Jews shall be performed in Israel in
accordance with Jewish religious law."
Second, the State of Israel established several other religious
institutions, in addition to the rabbinical courts. The State established
religious councils, which are administrative bodies in each locality
that provide religious services and distribute public funding for their
maintenance.' The state also established the Chief Rabbinate"
Justice nullified the ruling of the Grand Rabbinical Court-that applied Je%%ish Law
in a case regarding the respective rights of a man and woman to property upon
divorce-on the ground that the Rabbinical Court had acted outside its jurisdiction
by not taking into account the state's law granting women and men equal property
fights upon divorce.); Lev v. the Grand Rabbinical Court, 48(2) P.D. 457 (19)4). On
these recent decisions, see, Menachem Hofnung, The Unintended Consequences of
Unplanned Constitutional Reforn: Constitutional Politics in Israel 44 A'i. J. CouI. L
585,591 (1996).
6. It is common to argue that Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel,
decided to accept this arrangement, which was rooted in the millet system. out of his
concern for the unity of the Jews in the state and the outcry of Muslims against the
possibility of losing their religious courts. See DAN KURZ.iN,, BE\.-G!,RI10%:
PROPHET OF FiRE 25 (1983); NADAV SAFRAN, ISRAEL: THE EMBATTLED ALLY 203-
05,207 (1978).
7. Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law. 7 L.S.I. 139,
(1953). On the origins of the law and its applications see ZAtMAN S. ABRAOt,
PERPETuAL DILEMiA 179-98 (1976) [hereinafter Abramov, Perpetual Dilemma].
8. Jewish Religious Services Law, 25 L.S.I. 125, (1971). The religious councils
have existed since the times of the British Mandate, however, they grew in numbers
and power with the establishment of the state. There is a constant political and legal
debate over the powers of the religious councils. In several cases the Supreme Court
allowed-against the firm resistance of the religious establishment-women and non-
Orthodox Jews to sit in religious councils. In a partial response to these rulings, the
Knesset passed, on february 9, 1999, a bill-intended to bar non-orthodox Je%%s from
the religious councils-which requires council members to pledge that they will abide
by rulings of the Chief Rabbinate and of local rabbinates. Jewish Religious Services
Law (Amend. 10) (1999). Yet, the Bill's practical effect is still to be tested, as Reform
and Conservative representatives declared that they are prepared to make the pledge
in order to serve on the councils. For a comprehensive description of the religious
councils (in Hebrew) see ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA, MOSADMT D,,%TI I.PA
BAMAARECHEr HAPOLrrrr - -HAMOATSOT HADATyOT BEYISRAEL [Religious
1999]
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comprised of two chief rabbis-one Ashkenazi and one Sefaradi-
and a rabbinical council. The formal authority of the chief rabbis and
the council is limited. However, the Chief Rabbinate does enjoy
partial jurisdiction over several issues, including licensing of
marriages and divorces, kashrut (conformity with dietary law)1" and
authorization of judges of the religious courts. The Ministry of
Religious Affairs, which is the major governmental department that
provides funds and services for all religious communities, retains
authority over the religious councils. One of the religious parties
traditionally controls this ministry."
The third element of the status quo is the educational system.
State educational law12 divides the state educational syslem between
state schools and state religious schools. 3 The law allows a parent to
choose between state (secular) education and state religious
education when he registers his child in the state education system.
State funding of religious education in Israel is not confined to state
schools, but includes private schools, both elementary and
secondary. 4  These "recognized private schools" receive state
financial support that is substantially equivalent to that received by
official state schools.
The fourth component of the status quo involves observance of
Institutions in the Political System - The Religious Councils in Israel] (1988).
9. The Chief Rabbinate of Israel Law, 35 L.S.I. 97 (1980), regulates the
functions of the rabbinical council, its composition, and the election process of the
council and of the two Chief Rabbis. The Chief Rabbinate was established in
Palestine in 1921 by the British Mandate. On the origins of the Chief Rabbinate, see
ABRAMOV, PERPETUAL DILEMMA, supra note 7, at 92-97.
10. The kashrut (Prohibition of Deceit) Law, 37 L.S.I. 147 (1982-83), grants the
Chief Rabbinate a monopoly in certification of the kashrut of food.
11. See Abramov, Perpetual Dilemma, supra note 7, at 237.
12. State Education Law, 7 L.S.I. 113 (1953).
13. As Stephen Goldstein notes "The primary purpose of the State Education
Law, 1953 was to abolish the educational "streams" in the Jewish elementary
educational structure. Prior to this law elementary education in the Jewish sector
had been divided into four primary systems or streams, none of which was operated
by the State, and all of which were connected with political movements. They were
the Workers' stream (socialist, secular Zionist); the General stream (non-socialist,
secular Zionist); the Mizrachi stream (orthodox religious Zionist); and the Agudat
Yisrael stream (ultra-orthodox religious non-Zionist)." Stephen Goldstein, The
Teaching of Religion in Government Funded Schools in Israel, 26 ISR. L. REv. 36, 43
(1992).
14. This situation was justified as "a function of the recognition of the need for
autonomy in religious education as well as that of the desire for the creation of
exclusive and total religious educational environments as distinguished from merely
adding to or subtracting from curricular subjects." Goldstein, id. at 60.
[Vol. 22:617
Reevaluating Religion and State in Israel
the Sabbath and religious holidays. On these days all governmental
offices close, interurban and urban public transportation in most
areas of the State come to a halt, ' and military casual activities are
restricted to a minimum. Moreover, the Law of Working Hours and
Rest obliges all Jewish employers to rest on the Jewish Holidays' and
permits work only in factories essential to the economy or the
security of the state with a work permit."' In 1969, the law was
amended to include the self-employed. " Local authorities decide
whether places of public entertainment should open for business.
City councils, in many cities, issue municipal regulations prohibiting
the opening of places of public entertainment on these days."
15. With the exception of tourist buses, buses belong to non-Jewish bus
companies, taxies, and buses that operate in Haifa and Eilat. There is a gray area, of
constant debate, respecting the exact time of resuming bus service, especially in the
seasons when the Sabbath ends in the late evening.
16. Working Hours and Rest Law, § 7. 5 LS.I. 125 (1951). Non-Jews have the
option to rest either on their holidays or during the Jewish holidays.
17. Section 12 of the law empowers the minister of labor to permit the
employment of a worker on a day of rest "if he is satisfied that interruption of work is
likely to prejudice the defense of the State or the security of persons or property. or
seriously prejudice the economy or a process of work or the supply of services which,
in the opinion of the Minister of Labor, are essential to the public or part thereof."
The level of generosity in issuing work permits has changed throughout the years,
depending on the religious parties' bargaining power.
18. Hours of Work and Rest (Amendment) Law, 1969,23 L.S.I. 60 (196,-69). In
a striking departure from the status quo, the Jerusalem regional Labor Court has
recently acquitted Kibbutz Tsoraa and some of its members, who were sued by the
State of Israel for operating on Saturday two clothes-shops the Kibbutz owns. The
State claimed that the Kibbutz infringed § 9A(a) of the Working Hours and Rest
Law, which holds that during days of rest prescribed by the law, the owner of a
workshop shall not work in his workshop, the owner of a factory in his factory, and a
shop owner shall not trade in his shop. The state also sued some of the Kibbutz
members who operate the store based on § 9A(b), which prescribes that they may not
work in a shop on the rest-day. In a decision, handed down on 11-24-98, Judge A.
Tibon, ruled that it is not possible to define the religion of a cooperative corporation,
and thus, it is not possible to determine its prescribed day of rest. As to the Kibbutz
members, the judge held that while § 9A(b) prescribes work, it does not prohibit
trade. P/1043198, State of Israel v. Kibbutz Tsoraa Aguda Shitufit et a.;
(unpublished).
19. In 1987, a Jerusalem district court judge nullified a regulation prohibiting the
opening of places of public entertainment, holding that it was ultra vires. The State of
Israel v. Kaplan, 5748(2) Psakim Mechozivim (P.M.) 265. The decision clearly
deviated from the status quo, and generated angry reactions from the religious
parties. Eventually the primary legislation was amended to restore past regulations
and authorize future regulations in that field. Amendment of Municipalities
Ordinance (No. 40) Law, Sefer HaHukim [S.H]. 1336 (1990) pp. 34-35 (also known as
Hok HaHasmacha). Overall, however, the public observance of the Sabbath in Israel
has declined throughout the years. See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHtYA, RELIGION AND
1999]
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Fifth, the status quo includes observance of Jewish dietary laws:
production of pork is restricted by state law;" dietary laws are
observed by government kitchens, at official state events and all
military facilities;21 and some restrictions are imposed by law over the
sale of Chammets during Passover.n
The sixth element is the de facto exemption from army service
granted to Orthodox yeshiva students. According to Israeli law, army
service is mandatory for all citizens aged eighteen. Full time yeshiva
students, however, are allowed to defer their army service until they
complete their studies.' In most cases this delay means exemption
from all except a minimal form of reserve military service. There is
no unified Orthodox position on this issue. Most Ultra Orthodox
youngsters do not serve in the army,24 but in the Zionist Orthodox
circles it is customary to consider military service a religious duty no
less obligatory than the pursuit of learning.' Therefore, national
POLITICS IN ISRAEL, supra note 4, at 38-40.
20. Pig Raising Prohibition Law, 16 L.S.I. 93 (1962). The law applies to Jews and
Muslims, who are forbidden by their religion to raise pigs, but exempts Christian
communities and specifies "permitted areas"-localities in which Christians form a
majority. See also GARY J. JACOBSON, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES 30 (1993) (interpreting exemption of Christian
communities to Pig Raising Prohibition Law as reflection of majority's desire not to
offend religious minority).
21. Kosher Food for Soldiers Ordinance, 2 L.S.I. 37, (1948).
22. Matsot Law (Chammets Prohibition) (1986) (prohibits the exposition and
presentation of Chammets products during Passover).
23. Yet, in a landmark decision, handed down on December 10, 1998, the
Supreme Court ruled that the system, under which the defense Minister grants
exemptions, was illegal. An extended 11-judge panel gave the Knesset a year to pass
legislation on the issue, adding that if none is passed the present system would be
automatically canceled. H.C. 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense,
(unpublished).
24. The same is correct with respect to Ultra Orthodox girls, who are exempt
from army service upon a declaration of their religiosity. Most National Religious
girls either serve in the army or, alternatively, do national service.
25. On Modem-Orthodox and Ultra-Orthodox Judaism and the difference
between these streams, see Aaron Kirschenbaum, Fundamentali m: A Jewish
Traditional Perspective, in JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
: RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, AND THE CRISIS OF MODERNITY, 183 (Laurence J. Silberstein
ed., 1993). Modem-Orthodoxy is currently represented in the Knesset by the
National Religious Party (NRP) and the Ultra Orthodox stream by Agudat Yisrael
and Shas. On the NRP and its attitude towards the state, see Abramov, Perpetual
Dilemma, supra note 7, at 163-67; Liebman and Don-Yehiya, Religion and Politics in
Israel, supra note 4, at ch. 7. On the ideological rift between NPR and Agudat Israel
respecting army service, see Abramov, Perpetual Dilemma, supra note 7, at 248-52.
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religious boys do serve in the army.:
3. Justification
Commentators have offered several explanations as to why the
founding generation adopted the status quo formula. Yet, more
important is the issue which will be examined here-why Israelis
should continue to adhere to the status quo doctrine. The most
popular justification is based on three presuppositions: the first about
the nature of the subject matter, the second about the state of affairs
in Israel, and the third about the nature of the status quo itself.
The first presupposition has two variations. One is that the
subject of the relationship between religion and state is extremely
complicated and potentially explosive. A dispute over this issue
threatens, therefore, the stability of Israeli society. In a more
pessimistic sense, the second variation is that the dispute over the
proper relationship between religion and state in Israel is
irreconcilable,' and so maintaining such a dispute will be ineffective
in achieving a consensual compromise. What makes the dispute over
this issue so complicated or irreconcilable? What makes it so
explosive? The common response to this question is composed of
two arguments. First, proponents argue that Israeli Jewish society is
divided into two, diametrically opposed, subgroups: religious (or
Orthodox) and secular. These two groups allegedly maintain
contradictory and irreconcilable positions respecting the desirable
relationship between religion and state. Orthodox Jews feel they
cannot compromise their halakhie vision of the state and therefore
26. The state has accommodated, however, the national religious camp by
authorizing the establishment of the Hesder (lit. "arrangement") program in %Nhich
orthodox youngsters combine learning in a yeshiva with army service. For more
details on this program, see Stuart A. Cohen, The Hesder Yeshiot in Israel A
Church-State Agreement, 35 J. CHURCH & STATE 113 (1993). For an analysis of the
halakhic and ideological premises of this program see, Aharon Lichtenstein, The
Ideology of Hesder, 19 TRADITION 199 (1981).
27. See Zucker, supra note 3, at 101. ("The constitutional controversy appeared
to be irreconcilable ... Any resolution of the issue offensive to either the secularists
or the religionists would be no resolution, for a Kulturkampf was certain to follow").
28. Orthodox Jews are governed by a code known as the Shulchan Aruch (-the
Set table") written by Joseph Caro in the sixteenth century. This code, w hich is
considered the most authoritative of the Jewish legal codes, contains laws pertaining
to all aspects of Jewish life. It is divided into four major sections: Orach Chaim,
concerning daily commandments, Sabbaths, and festivals; Yorch De'ah, dealing with
various subjects, such as dietary laws, purity, honoring parents and teachers, charity,
and mourning; Even HaEzer, on marriages, divorces, and related topics: and Choshen
1999]
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cannot accept less than a full halakhic resolution. The secularists, on
the other side, can hardly compromise their secular, democratic,
vision of the state and therefore cannot accept anything less than a
fully democratic system. Second, proponents argue that the
comprehensive nature of Judaism29 creates enormous differences
between the religious and secular visions; hence the explosive nature
of the issue.
The second presupposition regards priorities. Proponents claim
that Israel faces life-threatening dangers that are much more urgent
than issues of religion and state' Therefore, Israel would benefit
from not debating the subject because such a controversy might
weaken Israeli solidarity and the ability of the state to face these life-
threatening dangers."
The third presupposition is that the status quo doctrine is the
perfect response to the complicated nature of the issue and the
particularly sensitive situation that Israel faces. Proponents consider
the status quo a perfect solution for two reasons. First, the status quo,
as implied by its name, incorporates a set of existing legal practices in
Mishpat, treating civil and criminal law. The sources for the laws found in the
Shulchan Aruch are the Bible, the Talmud, and the works and responsa of earlier
rabbinic scholars. The Shulchan Aruch, in turn, has been subject to a continuous
process of commentary and supercommentary by later scholars as new situations and
problems are encountered. This process continues today. The entire body of Jewish
law and tradition, comprising the laws of the Bible, the oral law as transcribed in the
Talmud, subsequent legal codes and commentary, and authoritative responsa
literature, is referred to as halakhah.
29. As explained in the previous note, Jewish law encompasses all aspects of
human life. In addition to classical religious rules and rituals, halakhah deals
comprehensively with legal matters that may arise in both private and public, and in
civil and criminal, realms. Observant Jews are expected to adhere not only to a few
religious requirements concerning the relationship between people and God, (i.e.
"religious law" in the narrow sense), but also to follow halakhah in ther relationships
with other persons, even in secular matters such as business dealings, financial
arrangements, contracts, etc.
30. YEHOSHAFAT HARAKABI, ISRAEL'S FATEFUL HOUR 1 (1988) ("The Arab-
Israeli conflict is the dominant issue of Israeli life. It casts its shadow on almost all
our activities-our politics, social relations, economic development, and military
deployment. As such, it determines our present and our future - as individuals and
as a nation.").
31. The Minister of Welfare at the time of the major constitutional debate in the
early fifties expressed such concern in the discussion at the Knesset. He said: "Don't
we have anything else to do besides starting a Kulturkampf, which, God forbid, might
destroy us and the state? We don't want war, and you brethren-don't be evil, don't
force such a war upon us. God forbid, my intention is not to threaten; I just want to
make it clear to all of you that such a shock will not pass without response.. ." D.K.
(vol. 4) 812.
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the areas of religion and state, and thus avoids the need to reconsider
the whole issue from the beginning. Second, the status quo is founded
upon vague principles. This vagueness creates flexibility, which
enables participants in the political arena to reach subtle and informal
resolutions over controversial issues that arise from time to time,
without the need to engage in a divisive, dangerous and endless
dispute over principles.n
B. Three Reasons for Abandoning the Status Quo
On its face, the above argument in favor of preserving the status
quo doctrine is sound. One may view the status quo as a product of
"politics of omission," to use Stephen Holmes's vocabulary.7 This
can be a prudent strategy. As Holmes observes, "to avoid destructive
conflicts, we suppress controversial themes. By tying our tongues
about a sensitive question, we can secure forms of cooperation and
fellowship otherwise beyond reach. '4  Also, as Holmes suggests,
removing certain items from the democratic agenda does not
contradict the idea of democracy but rather sometimes serves as "a
necessary condition for the emergence and stability of democracies.""
Eventually, "no issue is more frequently classified as 'worthy of
avoiding' than religion.' '
In the past, those in support of maintaining the status quo
doctrine could rely on Holmes's argument to depoliticize religious
issues. However, this argument can no longer serve as sufficient
justification for keeping the status quo intact for these reasons: first,
Israeli priorities have changed in the past two decades, making the
32. See Liebman and Don-Yehiya, Religion and Politics in Israel, supra note 3
("the status quo agreement supplies a pragmatic resolution to religious-secular
tensions and facilitates political partnership at the national level.").
33. Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission in
CONSIr-IONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 19 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds. 1933)
[hereinafter Holmes, Gag Rules]. For a completely different and much more positive
interpretation of, and approach towards, the status quo sce Gerald J. Blidstein,
Halakha and Democracy, 32 TRADmON 6, 23 (1997). Blidstein suggests that "these
compromises represent what different segments of the population consider not only
livable but also legitimate." For the orthodox people these compromises may be
seen as "reflecting a way of grappling.., with the reality of a Jewish people which
does not find its identity halakhically in our sense." For the secular people the
"willingness to tolerate rabbinic control also reflects a communitarian understanding
of society," a society for which Jevishness is its essence.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 25.
36. Id. at 23.
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question of religion and state exactly the kind of question that
"cannot remain unspoken,"37 to use again Holmes's vocabulary. In
present-day Israel, avoiding an open debate over the exact
relationship between religion and state might be more dangerous
than holding such a debate. Second, even if it is still preferable to
avoid a dispute over matters of religion and state, the status quo can
no longer forestall such a dispute. In the past several years the Israeli
legal and political system has undergone change which in the long run
will prevent the status quo doctrine from functioning as a gag rule.
1. Israel Can No Longer Avoid Public Discussion of Matters of
Religion and State
As Holmes observes, one essential precondition for the
willingness of rival groups to put aside their differences is an
overriding desire for national unity. He points to the shared concerns
for military security as the cause for that overriding desire in Israel."
However, this observation is no longer correct. Two recent, major
changes have made the discussion over religion and state extremely
urgent. These changes have made issues concerning religion and
state of a higher priority in the Israeli agenda than security matters.
The first change occurred in the international sphere; the second
within Israeli society.
First, although security matters are still an important concern,
Israel's existence is no longer seriously threatened by its neighbors. It
is quite clear that no surrounding coalition will be abe to achieve
strategic parity with Israel, a fact that convinced most of these states
to seek peace. 9 Now that external issues are losing some of their
urgency, Israel can focus on the internal issues. On many occasions
over the past several years, previously latent disagreements over
religion and state became a major cause for political and cultural
tensions in Israeli society. Therefore, the Israeli public is becoming
more aware that unresolved internal disagreements-especially the
dispute over the proper relationship between religion and state-pose
37. Id. at 38.
38. Id. at 48, n. 71.
39. On September 13, 1993, a joint Israeli-Palestinian 'Declaration of Principles'
was signed by the two parties in Washington. The DOP established a four phase
peace process, the first three of which have already been implement,.-d. In addition
to the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, there is a nineteen year-old
peace agreement between Israel and Egypt and a treaty of Peace between Israel and
Jordan, which was signed on October 26, 1994.
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the real threat to the country's stability.
A second and more important change took place within Israeli
society. In the past three decades or so, Israeli society has faced a
major crisis of values.' Secular Zionist values have lost their appeal.
The desire to develop the Jewish homeland and the willingness to
make personal sacrifices for the sake of achieving this goal is less
important to young Israelis. Individualism has taken the place of
collectivism." At the same time, no suitable replacement to the old
collective ideal has yet been adopted. Some Israelis would like to
transform the State of Israel into a "normal" secular western state.
They would like to replace Zionist values 'with liberal democratic
values. 2 For other Israelis, not necessarily Orthodox, it is clear that
the Jewish nation is unusual, and the state of Israel, as a Jewish state,
cannot and should not become a "normal" state like other western
democracies. 3 These Israelis strive to reconsider their Jewish identity
in a manner that might help them reestablish their link to the state of
Israel as a Jewish national state. In light of the value crisis that Israel
faces, there is a growing awareness among the Israeli public that the
time has come to seriously discuss the issue of religion and state in
40. See Abramov, Perpetual Dilenuna, supra note 7, at ch. 10. (-One of the
reasons that secularism is waning is the inadequacy of the traditional Zionist ideology
in the face of an existing state." Id. at 336).
41. For example, a significant percentage of Israeli youngsters from Kibbutzim,
which used to be regarded as Zionist bastions, leave Israel soon after they finish the
Israeli compulsory army service. See NAAATSABAR BEN-YEHOSHUA, KIBBUTS LA
(1996) [in Hebrew].
42. See, eg., A. B. YEHOSHUA, BIZCHLrr HA,.NORMALIUT [IN FvO R OF
NoRSIALrrY] (1980); YOSEF AGASI. BEIN DAT ULEOM [BE-BEEN RELIUIIU\' ,.D
NATIONALrrY] (1984) (Israel should be reestablished as a normal republic in the
conventional standard of the western. world). See id. at 18. This position prevails
especially among a new school of Israeli academicians, who are denoted post
Zionists.' Post Zionism is not a monolithic school of thought and its variations can
not be discussed here at length. However, common to many academicians %ho are
identified with Post Zionism are two claims that are relevant to our discussion. First.
they claim that there is an inherent and irresolvable tension between the State being
the state of the Jewish people and its commitment to basic moral premises. Second.
and as a result of the first argument, they argue that the State of Israel must abandon
its 'Jewish' and Zionist nature in order to comply with these moral premises. For a
critical discussion of the Post-Zionist's historical findings see Anita Shapira, P V'tIc
and Collective Memory: The Debate over the "'Nen Historians" in Israel, 7 Hisr. &
MEMORY 9 (1995).
43. See, e-g., YEHEZKEL DROR. CHIDUSH HATSlYONUT [REFOULDIN, ZIoniSM]
(1997); ELIEZER SCHWEID, HATSIYONUr SHEACHAREI I-ATSiYONUT [Z10%IS1M 1% A
POST-MODERNSTIc ERA] (1996): MOSHE SHAMIR, ZARKOR L.XOMEK: ZEHUTEIU
HAYEHUDrT MORESHET VEETGAR (1996).
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Israel in order to reach meaningful conclusions with iespect to the
identity of the state of Israel.
The Israeli agenda has been changing in the past several years,
and examination of the identity of the Jewish State is becoming an
urgent need. Under such circumstances, the status quo is no longer an
advantage but is instead an impediment towards articulating a
substantial resolution. To reach substantial resolution, it is necessary
to maintain meaningful and reflective public debate. Political deals
can no longer replace a serious discussion of principle. The fact that,
currently, issues of religion and state are neither defined in clear
language nor discussed freely in public may be attributed, in large
part, to the status quo.
2. The Status Quo Can No Longer Shield Israel from Divisive
Controversies
a. Two Prerequisites for a Working Informal Gag Rule
Even if we agreed, contrary to our conclusion in the last section,
that it is still better not to open questions of religion and state in
Israel to public debate, the status quo can no longer prevent
discussion of the issue. The status quo was never a permanent
arrangement. It is quite obvious that the status quo has been
transformed and modified throughout the years since the
establishment of the state.44 However, the changes were subtle and
moderate, a fact which enabled the disputants to ignore them. In the
past several years, though, the status quo doctrine was shaken up to
such an extent that it may not survive much longer, even as a flexible,
general framework. The status quo doctrine has become vulnerable
to major changes, a fact that prevents it from functioning effectively
as a gag rule.
Holmes distinguishes between formal and informal gag rules.
44. There is a dispute among scholars as to who benefited front these changes.
Klein (secular), for example, argues that significant changes were made in the status
quo in favor of the religious parties. Klein, supra note 3 at 199-202; Englard
(Orthodox), on the other side, claims that "[m]uch of the substance of the status quo
has been gradually eroded by judicial and legislative interventions, which... have
contrived to avoid or to reduce the effective opposition of the religious parties."
Izhak Englard, Law and Religion in Israel, 35 AM. JUR. COMP. L. 185, 192 (1987); Sec
also Don-Yehiya (Orthodox), Resolution of Religious Conflicts, supra note 3, at 216-
17, and Liebman and Don-Yehiya (Orthodox), Religion and Politics in Israel, supra
note 3, at 39 ("many aspects of Sabbath observance are now protected by law. But
overall, the public observance of the Sabbath in Israel has declined").
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Typically, formal gag rules are explicitly incorporated into the
constitutional framework, whereas informal gag rules can be based,
for example, on a "tacit agreement among political elites." ' The
Israeli status quo doctrine exemplifies the informal model. As
described above, none of the arrangements included in the status quo
received constitutional status and some of them were not even
established in regular legislation. Lacking entrenchment and
sometimes even lacking legal status, the power that kept the status
quo relatively intact was an unwritten understanding among the
leading political parties, an understanding that was based on their
mutual interest. As Holmes observes, the stability of such tacit
agreement is dependent upon two conditions: the permanent
existence of this mutual interest and the ability of the sides to the
agreement to prevent other powers from intervening. Both
preconditions have weakened substantially in Israel's legal and
political system, undermining the status quo doctrine.
b. The Political Equilibrium in Israel Was Interrupted
As explained above, the mutual interest underlying the status
quo doctrine was a desire not to initiate an endless battle over a
sensitive issue in a time of crisis. This description, however, is too
generous and only partly correct. National considerations alone did
not convince the sides of the political game to reach a compromise
and honor it; sectarian considerations were also important. A general
prerequisite for the stability of any political agreement-the status
quo being no exception-is the recognition that each side can lose
more than it can gain from breaking its promises. However, the
political sphere is by its nature unstable and constant equilibrium
hardly exists. For this reason, political agreements may last only a
short time. One could expect, then, that changes would also take
place in the status quo. This expectation was indeed partially fulfilled
in the past.' Nevertheless, Israeli politics has presented a unique
phenomenon of stability, temporary changes in the political
equilibrium notwithstanding. This phenomenon may be attributed to
45. Holmes, Gag Rules, supra note 33, at 25.
46. For example, in 1951 a women's lobby forwarded the Equal Rights for
Women Law 1951. This legislation undoubtedly trespassed deliberately on the
sphere explicitly reserved for the jurisdiction of the religious law and courts. But the
lobbyists succeeded in passing the law while exploiting a temporary quarrel bet-ween
Mapai, the leading political party at this time, and the religious parties, which
weakened the bargaining power of the religious parties.
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the fact that for almost thirty years the political balance of forces in
Israel has been such that no government could be formed without
Mapai, the largest political party in these times, yet could not be
formed by Mapai alone. In search of political partners, Mapai found
the religious parties more convenient than any of the other parties."
Both sides cautioned against exceeding the limits of their bargaining
powers and sought to preserve the status quo.
It was in the elections to the Ninth Knesset, in 1977, that the
political equilibrium was first interrupted, and since then it has not
recovered. In these elections, the Labor party-the successor of
Mapai-was defeated for the first time since the establishment of the
state, and the Likud-its rival on the right-gained power and
assumed the leadership. For the first time in Israeli history, the
religious parties became the power that could tilt the scales between
the two big parties. 4 They helped the Likud to compose a coalition,
and from these elections forward tried to translate their growing
power 9 into political achievements that occasionally grew out of
proportion to their real popular support." In turn, the two big
47. See ERVIN BIRNBAUM, THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE: STATE AND RELIGION
IN ISRAEL 24 (1970); ABRAMOV, PERPETUAL DILEMMA, supra note 7, at 148-54.
48. The two largest parties have also been in a constant decline in the past six
elections. In the elections to the 10th Knesset, that took place in 1981, the two big
parties got together 95 out of 120 Knesset seats; in 1984 they got 85; in 1988, 81, in
1992, 76; in 1996, 66; and in the last elections that took place in May 1999, they
received merely 45 seats. As a result of their declining power they now need to make
more concessions to their political allies than they have in the past.
49. The 1996 elections marked a remarkable growth not only in the bargaining
power of the religious parties, but also in their actual representation. Since the
establishment of the state, the religious block, even in its glorious days, never reached
more than 18 seats. In the 13th Knesset, they had 16 seats. In the 14th Knesset, they
gained 23 and in the elections to the present Knesset (the 15'), they gained 27. This
substantial growth should be attributed, in part, to the change in the electoral system
that took place in the last elections. See infra note 50.
50. The situation has been even worse since the elections to the 14th Knesset that
took place in 1996. These elections were the first to be held according to the new
Basic Law: The Government. According to the old system, which operated as a
classic parliamentary system, the president designated one of the Knesset Members
to assemble a Government after consultation with the various parties. The
government was formally established after this candidate concluded successfully the
negotiation with prospective partners and gained the confidence of the Knesset. The
major alleged defect of the old system was the disproportionate power that small
parties gained from these circumstances. According to the new law, the PM is
elected directly by the voters and merely represents his government before the
Knesset. The assumption and hope was that those who vote directly for a PM
candidate would also tend to vote for his party. Hence, direct voting for the PM was
expected to lead to concentration of the vote and to the elimination of many small
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parties, the Likud and the Labor party, which since 1977 have
switched the lead between them, started considering other parties as
potential coalition substitutes for the "religious block,"" including the
option of a national unity government composed of both big parties.
Thus, the religious parties ceased to be an essential component of any
coalition and lost some of their bargaining power. As a result of this
change, the status quo in its traditional shape is no longer secure.
c. The Growing Power of the Supreme Court
The second and more important factor that has contributed to
the declining power of the status quo is a process of change in the
relationship between the Israeli political branches and the Judiciary.
Until recently, Israel did not have a formal written constitution
and certainly not a written Bill of Rights. When the State of Israel
was established, it was assumed that it would adopt a constitutional
order. The Israeli declaration of independence asserted that a
constituent assembly, which was to be elected promptly, would enact
a constitution.' However, a political debate that began soon after the
establishment of the state, lasting nearly two years, made it clear that
such a constitution would not be achievable for the time being."
parties and a reduction of their bargaining power. Reality, however, worked the
other way. Instead of weakening the small parties and strengthening the big ones.
small parties got stronger and big parties got weaker. The probable reason for this
phenomenon is that unlike in the past, this time the voter did not have to consider the
party's chance to assemble the coalition while voting, so he did not have to
compromise his real agenda, and, therefore, voted for the party that mo',t clo,.Vly
represented his opinions. Two other benefactors of the new system, in addition to
the religions parties, are the Arab parties. which grew from 5 seats in the 13th
Knesset to 9 in the 14th Knesset and 10 seats in the present Knesset. and ne. partie',.
representing immigrants from the former USSR, which gained 7 seats in 1946i. and 11)
in the present Knesset. For a collection of articles, analyzing the 1t9 elections. 2e
ISRAEL AT THE POLLS (Daniel J. Elazar & Shmuel Sandier eds., 19914!: Ashcr Arian,
The Israeli Election .for Prime Minister and the Knesset / t/b, in 17 ELE t*OL
STuDiEs 574 (1996). For a short evaluation of the new system, see Araham Brichta,
The New Premier-Parliamentary System in Israel, in 555 THE AN'Aust lV0 (Gabriel
Ben-Dor ed. 1998).
51. In the 13th Knesset, The Labor party, led by the late PM Rabin and PM
Peres. relied for a long time on the Arab parties for their majority. This v, as the firt
time in Israel's history for such a reliance.
52. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 L.S.I. 3. 4 (14N).
The declaration refers to "the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the
State in accordance with the Constitution, which shall be adopted by the Elected
Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948." Id.
53. The constitutional debate formed two political camps not on the basis of
ideologies of the Left or the Right. Thus, movements on the Left (Mapam) allied
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Finally, on 13 June 1950, the Knesset adopted a compromise
resolution-named after its initiator, the "Harari Resolution" -to
enact a constitution gradually, chapter by chapter, in the form of
Basic Laws. Accumulated together, these Basic Laws would form the
future Israeli Constitution.
The Harari Resolution was not implemented for approximately
fory-four years. Throughout these years Israel indeed adopted
several Basic Laws.' However, these laws merely codified previous
legislation and did not themselves attain constitutional status. Most
of the provisions of these laws were not legally entrenched and none
of them were explicitly granted supreme status. The Israeli Supreme
Court held that only entrenched provisions of Basic Laws had
normative superiority over regular legislation56 and refused to strike
themselves with movements from the Right (Herut) and Center (General Zionists) to
support a constitution, and they were opposed by the leading party, Mapai, and the
Orthodox religious parties. See DAFNAH SHARFMAN, LIVING WITHOUT A
CONSTITUTION: CIVIL RIGHTS IN ISRAEL 38-45 (1993). But cf. Giora Goldberg,
Religious Zionism and the Framing of a Constitution for Israel, 3 ISRAEL STUDIES 211
(1998) (arguing that the religious political parties did not oppose the idea of framing
a constitution during the initial stage of Israeli statehood, but changed their attitude
only after Ben-Gurion began to publicly express his inclination to avoid a
constitution. Realizing that Ben-Gurion's opposition would block the process of
framing a constitution, the religious political leaders preferred to oppose the
constitutional idea so as to present a political achievement to their voters). For first-
hand information on the background and history of the constitutional debate, see
ZERACH WARHFTIG, HUKA LEISRAEL-DAT UMEDINAH, [A CONSTITUTION TO
ISRAEL-RELIGION AND STATE] (1988).
54. 5 Knesset Protocols 1743 (1950). The Resolution states: "The first Knesset
directs the Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Committee to prepare a draft
Constitution for the State. The Constitution shall be composed of separate chapters
so that each chapter will constitute a basic law by itself. Each chapter will be
submitted to the Knesset as the Committee completes its work, and all the chapters
together shall be the State's constitution."
55. Nine structural Basic Laws were enacted: Basic Law: The Knesset, 12 L.S.I.
85 (1958); Basic Law: Israel Lands, 14 L.S.I. 48 (1960); Basic Law: 'rhe President of
the State, 18 L.S.I. 11 (1964); Basic Law: The Government, 22 L.S.I. 257 (1969), (this
law was recently replaced by a new version, Hok Yesod: HaMemshalah (Basic Law:
The Government), Sefer HaHukim (S.H.) 214 (1992), which came into force
beginning with elections for the 14th Knesset in 1992 and authorized the direct
election of the prime minister)); Basic Law: The State Economy, 29 L.S.I. 273 (1975);
Basic Law: The Army, 30 L.S.I. 150 (1976); Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel,
34 L.S.I. 209 (1980); Basic Law: Judicature, 38 L.S.I. 101 (1984); and Hok Yesod:
Mevaker HaMedinah (Basic Law: The State Comptroller), S.H. 30 (1988). English
Translation of the Basic Laws is available in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THES COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds. 1988,1994).
56. See Tnuat Laor v. Speaker of the Knesset, 44(3) P.D. 529 (1990); Rubinstein
v. Speaker of the Knesset, 37(3) P.D. 141 (1983); Agudat Derech Eretz v.
Broadcasting Auth., 35(4) P.D. 1 (1981); Bergman v. Minister of Fin., 23(1) P.D. 693
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down ordinary legislation found to contradict non-entrenched
provisions.' Also, "the Basic Laws enacted were mainly structural
laws defining the form of government and the powers of the
government's three branches." '' In contrast to the progress made in
enacting structural laws, no substantive laws have been passed. The
Knesset has totally abstained from adopting any sort of bill of rights,
in spite of numerous attempts over the years to pass such legislation."
Such attempts were not likely to succeed. Constitutions are
commonly enacted in revolutionary moments in the history of
nations, in which the basic premises of the system are questioned and
controversies can be bridged due to the villingness of all sides to
transcend their narrow interests and seek a meaningful resolution
that involves substantial compromise. In Israel, the "historic
moment" during the era of the establishment of the state has lapsed
without producing the necessary consensus, and no new historic
moment has occurred. The gap between different factions of the
Israeli society was not closed, but widened. Against this background,
pessimism regarding the prospects for enactment of an Israeli Bill of
Rights was reasonable.6'
The lack of a written Bill of Rights did not prevent the Israeli
(1969). All of these cases discuss the principle of equality in elections. See also
Claude Klein, A New Era in Israel's Constitutional Law, 6 ISR. L. REv. 376 (1971).
57. See Kaniel v. Minister of Justice, 27(1) P.D. 794 (1973).
58. Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli
Challenge in American Perspective, 26 CoLUM. H. R. L. REv. 309,315 (1995).
59. For the history of the failed proposals to enact civil rights in Israel, see
Amnon Rubinstein, HaMishpat HaKonstitutsiyoni shel Medinat Yisrael [Tite
Constitutional Law of the State of Israel] 704-07 (1991); See also Amos Shapira, Why
Israel Has No Constitution, 37 ST. Louis U. L. J. 283 (1993).
60. See Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution.Making Process, 45
DUKE L. J. 364, 370 (1995) ("The fact is that new constitutions almost ah~ays are
written in the wake of a crisis or exceptional circumstance of some sort"); PETER H.
RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANs BECOME A SOVEREIGN
PEOPLE? 106 (2d ed., 1993) ("No liberal democratic state has accomplished
comprehensive constitutional change outside the context of some catacl)smie
situation such as revolution, world war, the withdrawal of empire, civil war, or the
threat of imminent breakup.").
61. Ruth Gavison, a leading Israeli constitutional scholar, expressed such
pessimism in 1985. She stated, "[tloday it would seem almost strange to conduct
arguments about the basic premises of the state in the midst of normal politics. It
appears that the unique opportunity for a Bill of Rights has passed, at least for
now .... The power to make a Constitution has not elapsed, but the opportunity has
gone. Israel needs another moment of national elation to allow agreement on the
formulation of a Constitution." Ruth Gavison, The Controversy Over Israel's Bill of
Rights, 15 IsR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTs. 113, 153-54 (1985).
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Supreme Court from becoming a powerful institution. Through its
own precedent, the Israeli Supreme Court established the
constitutional status of certain principles, including freedom of
religion," even without a formal written constitution.6 The Court
enforced these principles in two ways: statutory interpretation and
administrative review. First, where the Court considered a law to
infringe on constitutional principles and to be vague, it construed the
law narrowly, to protect constitutional principles.' Second, the Court
nullified secondary legislation and administrative acts that it
considered infringed upon these principles. Governmenl al violations
of these principles, without express statutory authority, were
considered ultra vires and therefore void.
Notwithstanding its relatively strong position, in the absence of a
written constitution the Supreme Court has not been able, until
recently, to perform Judicial Review. Lacking a written constitution,
the fundamental premise of the Israeli legal system-adhering to the
English model-was the sovereignty of the legislature. 6  This
sovereignty existed through the absolute supremacy of th-, laws of the
Israeli parliament (the Knesset), regardless of their substantive
62. See Peretz v. Local Council of Kfar Shmaryahu, 16 P.D. 2101, 2116, translated
in 4 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL (hereinafter SELECTED
JUDGMENTS) 191 (1962). Among other rights that the court declared and enforced
are: freedom of occupation (See Bejarano v. Minister of Police, 2 P.D. 80 (1949));
personal liberty (See A-Karbutli v. Minister of Defense, 2 P.D. 5 (1948)); freedom of
speech (See Kol Ha'am v. Minister of the Interior, 7 P.D. 871, translated in 1
SELECTED JUDGMENTS 90 (1953); Laor v. Theater Review Bd., 41(1) P.D. 421 (1987);
Shnitzer v. Chief Military Censor, 42(4) P.D. 617 (1988); Kahane v. Broad. Auth.,
41(3) P.D. 255 (1987)); equality (See Peretz, Id.; Younes v. Dir. Gen. of the Prime
Minister's Office, 35(3) P.D. 589 (1981); Poraz v. Mayor of Tel Aviv, 42(2) P.D. 309
(1988)); procedural due process (Berman v. Minister of the Interior, 12 P.D. 1493,
translated in 3 SELECTED JUDGMENTS 29 (1958)).
63. See generally Jeffrey M. Albert, Constitutional Adjudication without a
Constitution: The Case of Israel, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1245 (1969); Amos Shapira, The
Status of Fundamental Individual Rights in the Absence of a Written Constitution, 9
ISR. L. REv. 497 (1974); Baruch Bracha, The Protection of Human Rights in Israel, 12
ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 110 (1982); Amos Shapira, Judicial Review Without a
Constitution: The Israeli Paradox, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 405 (1983); Asher Maoz, Defending
Civil Liberties Without a Constitution-The Israeli Experience, 16 MELB. U. L. REV.
815 (1988); Rubinstein, supra note 59, at 701-848.
64. For a recent example of the use that the Israeli Supreme Court made of
administrative review, see Hofnung, supra note 5, at 590-91.
65. See, e.g., Shnitzer, 42(4) P.D. at 626-28 (involving judicial intervention in the
discretion of military censorship).
66. For the English doctrine, see H.W.R. Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty,
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 172 (1955).
[Vol. 22:617
Reevaluating Religion and State in Israel
content.' The judiciary could not, therefore, declare primary laws
unconstitutional, even if it found a law to contradict a constitutional
principle.'
Under these circumstances the Supreme Court could not
seriously challenge the status quo. For example, the choice of civil
marriage is not available in Israel. This creates a practical bar on
marriages of people holding different religions and poses a problem
for secular people who do not want to participate in a religious
ritual.'9 In addition, within Judaism the Orthodoxy enjoys exclusive
authority over marriages and divorces, a fact that creates a problem
for those who adhere to the customs of other denominations of
Judaism.' The Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of these
problems. Nevertheless, in several rulings, the Supreme Court held
that so long as the law explicitly transfers the authority over
marriages and divorces of Jews to the Orthodox authorities, the
Court could not accept a petition challenging this monopoly.7
In the last eight years, the Israeli legal system has begun to
experience a fundamental constitutional change. In March 1992, the
12th Knesset enacted two Basic Laws: Basic Law: Freedom of
67. See, e.g., Ezuz v. Ezer, 17 P.D. 2541, 2547 (1963) ("The Knesset is sovereign
and has the power to enact any law and give it content-as it pleases. It is entirely
inconceivable that a duly enacted Knesset law, or any provision thereof, should for
any reason be deprived of validity.") See also Batzul v. Minister of the Interior 1l 1)
P.D. 337,349 (1963).
68. In one case, however, Justice (now Chief Justice) Aharon Barak has indicated
in dicta the theoretical possibility of performing judicial review in extreme cases of
legislation repugnant to basic values such as equality. However, he stated at the
same time that it would be unacceptable to set such precedent within the present
social understanding regarding the limits of the court. See Tnuat Laor, 4413) P.D. 529.
551-54.
69. However, such ceremonies performed outside of Israel are administratively
recognized. Many Israelis who cannot or do not want to get married in a religious
ceremony use this alternative.
70. See Movement for Progressive Judaism in Israel Fund v. Minister of Religious
Affairs, 43(2) P.D. 661 (1989), abridged in 25 Isn. L. REv. 110, 110 (1991). In this
case, the Supreme Court rejected an appeal to order the Minister of Religious Affairs
to recognize Reform rabbis as "registering authority" for the purpose of the Marriage
and Divorce (Registration) Ordinance. Consequently, wedding ceremonies
conducted by Reform and Conservative rabbis are not recognized by Israeli law.
71. See, e.g., Rogozinski v. Israel, 26(1) P.D. 129 (1971). This case dealt vdth a
petition that was filed by a non-believing couple, requesting to be relieved of the
obligation to undergo a religious ceremony of the rabbinate. The court rejected the
petition, arguing that "The law of the State which submitted matters of marriage and
divorce of Jews... to the law of the Torah, takes precedence over the principle of
freedom of conscience." Id. at 135.
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Occupation,' and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty." As
interpreted by the Israeli Supreme Court, these laws provide for
judicial review-by any court, not only the Supreme Court-of
Knesset legislation. Religious matters are not directly among the
enumerated rights in these two Basic Laws. Freedom of Religion and
Equality, for example, were not included in the bills because of strong
opposition from the religious parties who feared that the inclusion of
these rights would influence the existing legal status of family law.74
Nevertheless, without directly touching on issues of religion and state,
other rights that are included in these two Basic Laws potentially
affect matters included in the status quo doctrine." This potential
effect stems from the comprehensive nature of the Jewish religion.
For example, a year after the enactment of Basic Law: Freedom
of Occupation, the Supreme Court nullified administrative
regulations which restricted the importation of non-kosher meat on
the ground that the restrictions violated freedom of occupation7 The
nullification of these regulations generated angry reactions from the
religious parties that correctly considered the outcomes of these
decisions to be a violation of the status quo. The religious parties
struggled to find ways to restore the previous arrangement. They did
not bother to reestablish the status quo doctrine in primary legislation
because they were concerned that the Supreme Court would use
judicial review to nullify that primary legislation as well. Instead,
employing a different strategy, they succeeded in amending Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation to include an overriding clause similar
72. Hok Yesod: Hofesh HaIsuk (Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation), 1992, S.H.
114.
73. Hok Yesod: Kevod HaAdam VeHeiruto (Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty), 1992, S.H. 150, translated in 31 ISR. L. REv. 21,21-23 (1997).
74. While the Orthodox monopoly on certain aspects of personal status, with the
inequality between men and women that it entails, is the first exampl . that comes to
mind, the inclusion of these two rights might have an impact on a much wider array
of controversial issues, such as the legal status of homosexual couples (see El-Al
Airlines v. Danilowits, 48(5) P.D. 749 (1994)), the draft of Yeshiva students (see H.C.
3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense, (unpublished)), and the legal status of
alternative Jewish religious streams (see, e.g., Goldstein v. Minister of the Interior,
49(4) P.D. 661 (1995)).
75. In addition, there is good reason to predict that the Supreme Court will
interpret Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty to include freedom of religion, even
though it is not explicitly mentioned. See infra text accompanying notes 102-105
respecting that possibility.
76. See Meatrael Ltd. v. Minister of Commerce and Indus., 47(5) P.D. 485 (1993).
[Vol. 22:617
Reevaluating Religion and State in Israel
to the Canadian 'notwithstanding' clause? As a result, section 8 of
Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation now states that "a statutory
provision which infringes freedom of occupation will be valid... if it
is included in a statute enacted by a majority of the Knesset members
and expressly declares that it is valid despite the Basic Law.""
Following this amendment, the Knesset enacted legislation that
enables the government to restrict the importation of non-Kosher
meat. 7 9 Non-Kosher meat importers appealed again to the Supreme
Court to nullify this new law. In December 1996, the Supreme Court
found the legislation contradicted freedom of occupation. However,
the court did not nullify the law because it found that it satisfied the
overriding clause.9
At first glance, it seems that the status quo doctrine has prevailed
over the challenges. It has not. To meet the criteria of the overriding
clause, a law must satisfy two requirements. A proposed law must be
supported by a majority of the Knesset and must expressly state that
it shall take effect notwithstanding the provisions of the Basic Law.
These requirements weaken the bargaining positions of supporters of
such laws compared to their positions prior to the enactment of the
Basic Law. Additionally, according to the overriding clause, even if
the law meets the requirements of the notwithstanding clause, it may
not exceed four years' duration."'
77. Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states: "(1)
Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision
thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7
to 15 of this Charter. (2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a
declaration made under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would
have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the declaration. (3) A
declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years after it
comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the declaration. (4)
Parliament or a legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made under
subsection (1). (5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under
subsection (4)." CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms), § 33. For an analysis of section 33 see CHRISTOPHER P.
MAINFREDI, JUDICIAL POWER AND THE CHARTER: CANADA AND THE PARXDOX OF
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 188-211 (1993); Caroline S. Earle, The American
Judicial Review Quagmire: A Canadian Proposal, 68 IND. LJ. 1357 (1993).
78. Hok Yesod: Hofesh HaIsuk (Basic Lawv: Freedom of Occupation). 1994, S.H.
90, § 8.
79. Hok Yevu Basar Kafu (Import of Frozen Meat Law), 1994, S.H. 104.
80. See Meatrael v. Knesset, 50(5) P.D. 15 (1996).
81. On March 18, 1998, several days before the four-year ban on the import of
non-kosher meat expired, the Knesset amended section 8 so that the Basic Law
would not apply to a law enacted within one year after the effective date of the Basic
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The battle over importation of non-Kosher meat and the latest
decision of the Israel Supreme Court perfectly illustrate the new
power that Israeli courts have gained over issues of religion and state.
Under this new construction, the political parties are no longer the
sole players on the status quo field and, thus, the informal gag rule
that they composed cannot survive.'
3. Discussing Religion and State Has a Unifying Rather Than
Divisive Potential
Two reasons have been cited thus far in support of reevaluation
of the relationship between religion and state in Israel--the urgent
need to redefine the goals and basic values of the state and the
collapse of the status quo as a functional gag rule. There is a third
reason for such reevaluation. As noted above, the major reason that
deterred the Israeli polity from freely deliberating issues of religion
and state and the argument used by some of the present opponents of
such reevaluation is the concern that such deliberation would result in
divisiveness. This reasoning is not self-evident. Notwithstanding
some extreme political declarations from both sides, the gap between
the competing positions over issues of religion and state in Israel is
not as deep as some may think. Interests of the religious and secular
sectors are more similar than different. The religious sectors do not
necessarily support abolishing the democratic nature of the state by
establishing a the economy' instead.' It is not very likely that
Law. As a result, it is no longer necessary to renew the legislation restricting the
importation of non-Kosher meat. Although the law simply preserves the status quo,
some of those who voted against the bill described it in harsh words as "kosher but
stinks" (Tsomet whip Eliezer Zandberg) or as the result of "non-kosher
parliamentary blackmail" (Meretz leader Yossi Sarid).
82. The recent constitutional change has shaken the Israeli legal arena and
culture in several important dimensions. See, Ran Hirschl, Israel's "Constitutional
Revolution": The Legal Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties in an Emerging
Neo-Liberal Economic Order, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 427, 450-51 (1998) (arguing, quite
powerfully, that the "Constitutional Revolution" reflects and promotes a
fundamental change that is "transforming Israel from a collectivist state with a
mobilized (Jewish) society and centralized economy, into a more individualistic
society with a free market orientation and culture.")
83. A Theonomy, or a Religious Nomocracy differs from theocracy. In a classic
theocracy, God is the ruler, and the means through which he rules-priests, judges,
prophets etc.-have very minimal flexibility. In a religious nomocracy the divine law
does indeed exist, but the power is invested in the hands of its interpreters. As
Aaron Kirschenbaum has observed, "The distinction between theocracy and religious
nomocracy is not merely semantic; its ramifications are far reaching. Not the locus of
the theoretic authority decides, but rather the center in which this authority
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mainstream secular Jews in Israel will advocate a strict separation
between religion and state.' Public deliberation over matters of
religion and state may expose these facts, thus unifying, rather than
dividing, the vast majority of the Jews in Israel.
A group of two MKs," their advisors, and four Orthodox rabbis"
has been meeting for more than a year attempting to work out a new
covenant on Religion and State in Israel. A covenant was signed on
February 18, 1998, at the Israeli President's house in Jerusalem, and
was presented to the President, Ezer Weizmann. It made front-page
news in the Israeli press and was introduced as the best hope for
renewing religious/non-religious partnership. Although public figures
from both the Orthodox and secular camps promptly criticized the
materializes. Any Jurist knows that the law is not the ruler but rather its interpreter."
Aaron Kirschenbaum, Teokratva Yehudit [Jewish Theocracy], 8 DINEt ISRAEt, 223,
225 (1977). Moreover, the Jewish sages, those empowered to interpret and develop
the Jewish law, may come-and indeed came-from various classes and not only
from the elite or any other special class. In such a nomocracy, certain aspects of
democracy may exist. On religious nomocracy see also J. Faur, Some General
Observations on the Character of Classical Jewish Literature: A Functional Approach,
28 J. JEWISH STUD. 37, nn. 44-45 (1977). The fact that most of the interpretive and
creative power is invested, in a religious nomocracy, in the hands of the religious
authorities may create a tension between the divine wvill and those in charge of its
interpretation. The classic source that presents this reality is the narrative of the
Oven of Akhnai. On this narrative, see Suzanne L. Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-
Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporar' American Legal Theory,
106 HARv. L. REV. 813, 855-65 (1993).
84. This argument, which I develop at length in Gidon Sapir, Can an Orthodox
Jew Participate in Anything but a Jewish-Law State?, 202 SHOFAR: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF JEWISH STUDIES (forthcoming, %vinter 2 2, is
based on the following propositions:
A paradigmatic Halakhic state does not necessarily contradict the democratic
model. Even if there is some tension between the two, nevertheless, an observant Jew
can live in a democratic state that does not fully adhere to the Halakhic model
without compromising his religious duties.
Under the present circumstances, where the vast majority of Israeli citizens
do not observe religion, doubt remains whether it is desirable, from the Orthodox
perspective, that Israel adhere to the Orthodox model.
85. It is hardly contested by the vast majority of the Jewish people in Israel that
Israel is and should remain a Jewish national state. Almost no one %%ho has
suggested a secular definition for Jewish nationhood has tried-and no such
definition has succeeded-in detaching Jewish nationality from its religious sources.
In other words, Jewish religion and Jewish nationality are interwoven.
86. Dr. Yossi Beilin (Labor) and Professor Alex Lubotsky (Third Way).
87. Michael Melchior, Yehuda Gilad, Shmuel Reiner, and Zvi Wolff. All these
rabbis are members of Maimad. a dovish modem Orthodox political mouement in
Israel that joined powers with the Labor Party in the 1999 elections and managed to
place one representative (Rabbi Malchior) in the Knesset.
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proposal, its very existence shows that public deliberation over
matters of religion and state may unify rather than divide the vast
majority of the Jews in Israel.
III. Regulating the Relationship Between Religion and State in
a Constitutional Framework
A. Introduction-Defining "Constitution"
The relationship between religion and state in Israel must be
reevaluated. However, several obstacles exist to opening the status
quo to reevaluation. One major obstacle is the Orthodox leadership's
concern that any substantive reevaluation will lead to a change in
procedure. The Orthodox leadership does not oppose reevaluating
the issue as much as it resents the idea that judges, whom this
leadership does not trust, will be empowered to interpret and enforce
any resulting arrangement.' It is plausible that reevaluation of the
status quo doctrine will result in the constitutional entrenchment of
this new arrangement. The goal of this section is to explain why (at
least in principle) constitutionalizing the relationship of religion and
state serves everyone's interests-including that of the Orthodoxy-
and to outline the conditions required to make it work.
Different types of documents have received the title
"constitution".' Thus, the concept of "constitution" must be clearly
defined before discussion proceeds.
The "constitution" that will be discussed here is a legislative
document that enjoys three basic characteristics. First, it declares
itself to be the supreme law, which means it is superior to ordinary
legislation.' Second, it is entrenched, which means its amendment
88. See, e.g., MK Itzhak Levy (NPR), Speech in the Knesset plenum, (Mar. 9,
1994) D.K. (1994) 5372 (expressing the conventional approach of the religious parties
against the Supreme Court becoming the main source for the creation of social
values).
89. I refer to "documents". However, constitutions can also be unwritten.
90. For example, Article VI of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]his
Constitution... shall be the supreme law of the land." See also Article 98 of the
Japanese Constitution. The superior character of the constitution might vary
between absolute and limited supremacy. The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, with its notwithstanding clause allowing for an overriding of the
constitution, is an example of a constitution with limited supremacy. However, the
very requirement of including the notwithstanding clause in contradicting legislation
and the special majority required to pass such a clause, reflect a recognition that the
charter is ranked higher than regular legislation in the legislative hierarchy.
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procedure is more stringent than that of ordinary legislation. ' Third,
its official guardian is the judicial branch. The judiciary holds the
power to review legislation and executive acts, and to subsequently
declare them void if they contradict the constitution. "
As to the contents of constitutional documents, the provisions of
constitutions are commonly divided into two parts: structure and
substance. The structural part includes institutional arrangements,
basic rules for the functioning of these institutions, and the
relationship between them. The substantive part includes
fundamental human rights and values.
B. The New Reality-Is the Question Still Relevant?
As explained earlier, one of the changes that recently took place
in Israel which prevents the status quo doctrine from continuing to
function as a gag rule is the adoption of the two new Basic Laws. An
examination of these Basic Laws, as they were interpreted by the
Israeli Supreme Court, shows that to a large extent they match the
characteristics presented above.
Under the Israeli constitutional doctrine, as shaped by the
Supreme Court, the entrenched status of a specific provision is
understood to indicate the supremacy of that provision and the power
of the judiciary to perform judicial review based on that provision."
91. Similar to the first requirement, constitutions might vary in the level of
rigidity they enjoy. In its most extreme form, the right of repeal is totally denied.
However, less absolute approaches are more common. Article 96 of the Japanese
Constitution provides that "amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the
Diet, through a concurring vote of two thirds or more of all the members of each
House." Article 11 of the Japanese Constitution, however, arguably immunizes some
constitutional provisions against amendment. Absolute entrenchment arguably
applies in the Constitution of Germany as well in respect to several fundamental
principles. See Anupam Chander, Sovereignty-, Referenda, and the Entrenchment of a
United Kingdom Bill of Rights, 101 YALE L. J. 457, 462 & n. 30 (1991). For a
discussion of different types of entrenchment and traditional objections to it see
Julian E. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 1987 Am. B. FOUND. REs. J. 379 (1987).
92. For example, Article 81 of the Japanese Constitution provides that "[tihe
supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the
constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act." For a comparative
review of JR in European states, see MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ch. 4 (1989), ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL
REviEw IN CoARATtvE LAW (1989). For a comprehensive argument for Judicial
Review see William J. Brennan Jr., Why Have a Bill of Rights? 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 425,426-27 (1989).
93. For an overview of this doctrine see MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLITICS,
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Several Basic Laws, which were enacted by the Knesset, consist of
two types of provisions: regular and entrenched.' The Israeli
Supreme Court has ruled that such entrenched provisions of Basic
Laws, and only such provisions, have normative superiority over
regular statutes." The Court has been willing to review and invalidate
statutes that were found to contradict entrenched provisions of Basic
Laws,96 but refused to review statutes based on other provisions of
Basic Laws that are not entrenched.
Of the two new Basic Laws-Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation-only the latter has
a clear entrenchment provision. Section 7 of Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation provides that "this Basic Law shall not be varied except
by Basic Law passed by a majority of the members of the Knesset.""
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, does not contain a similar
entrenchment provision. Such a clause was included in the original
bill but was omitted during the legislative process. Under
constitutional precedent, one could reasonably predict that the
omission of an entrenched provision from Basic Law: Human Dignity
and Liberty would deny this law a supreme status and, therefore,
prevent the court from reviewing contradicting primary laws. The
Supreme Court, however, held differently.
In a decision handed down on November 9, 1995, the majority of
an expanded bench of nine justices of the Court held, contrary to
prevailing Israeli constitutional doctrine, that both Basic Laws enjoy a
status superior to that of ordinary legislation. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court held that the judiciary retains the power of judicial
review based on both Basic Laws." Under the Israeli precedent rules,
AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 13-25 (1994).
94. The Supreme Court considered as entrenched provision; that may be
amended according to the law by only the vote of a qualified majority of Knesset
members.
95. See Kaniel, 27(1) P.D. 794.
96. See Rubinstein, 37(3) P.D. 141; Agudat Derech Eretz, 35(4) P.D. 1; Bergman,
23(1) P.D. 693. See also Claude Klein, A New Era in Israel's Constiutional Law, 6
ISR. L. REv. 376 (1971).
97. This entrenchment is stronger than previous entrenchmc:nts because it
requires not only a special majority to change the provisions of the Basic Law as
previous entrenchments required but also indicates that change could occur only
through enactment of a new Basic Law.
98. United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Co-operative Village, 49(4) P.D. 221
(1995), abridged in 31 Is. L. REv. 764 (1997). The decision related to legislation that
affected the rights of creditors to collect debts against agricultural settlements.
Creditors had argued that the said legislation violated their property right, protected
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this opinion alone did not gain precedential status, since it was not
part of the ratio decidenti but merely obiter dictum." However, in a
decision handed down on September 25, 1997, the Supreme Court
nullified for the first time a primary legislation that was found to
contradict Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation,"" and on October 14,
1999, the Court did the same to a law that was found to contradict
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty"''
As interpreted by the Supreme Court both Basic Laws enjoy the
three characteristics of a constitution: supremacy, entrenchment, and
empowerment of the judiciary. What impact does this have on
matters of religion and state? On the one hand, the two Basic Laws
protect basic human rights, such as the right to engage in any
occupation, the right to life, body and dignity; the right to property,
the right to liberty, and the right to privacy. On the other hand, they
do not protect freedom of religion and equality, the two rights with
the greatest impact over matters of religion and state, which, as was
explained earlier, were intentionally omitted from the bill as part of a
political compromise. Therefore, as a prima facie case it could be
assumed that the constitutional change has relatively limited impact
on matters of religion and state. However, this initial conclusion is
incorrect. First, as was explained earlier, due to the all-encompassing
nature of the Jewish religion, the very enactment of the Basic Laws
already puts the court in a position to review primary legislation
governing issues included in the status quo doctrine. Second, and
more importantly, it is quite probable that despite the intentional
under section 3 of Basic Law- Human Dignity and Liberty.
99. In a sense the Supreme Court used in this decision the same strateg ° that
Chief Justice Marshall used in Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (VI93).
Like Justice Marshall, the Israeli Supreme Court claimed for itself the power of
judicial review but avoided performing that power by finding the lay, at ,take to
comply with the basic law. The court found that the property rights of the creditors
were indeed violated by the legislation, but that the legislation fulfilled the
requirements of section 8 and was therefore valid (Section 8 states that -[tjhere shall
be no violation of rights under this basic lav except by a law befitting the values of
the state of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than is
required.")
100. Association of Investment Management v. Finance Minister, H.C. 1715,7
(unpublished). In this case, the High Court of Justice nullified a section of a nev, law
which regulated the licensing of investment consultants, based on their freedom of
occupation.
101. Zemach v. Defense Minister, H.C. 6055195 (unpublished). In this case, the
High Court of Justice ruled that Article 237A of the Military-Justice Law, allow.ing
the military police to detain soldiers for four days without bringing them before a
judge, violated Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and was therefore void.
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omission of freedom of religion and equality, the Supreme Court will
still read them into the present Basic Laws. In an extrajudicial
writing, Israeli Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon Barak claimed
that the concept of 'human dignity', mentioned in Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty, should be interpreted broadly to include "all
those human rights that have a close substantive connection to human
dignity and liberty according to prevailing concepts among the
enlightened public in Israel. ' 'l" In a more deliberate extrajudicial
writing, Chief Justice Barak listed equality and freedom of religion
among the missing rights that should be read into the Basic Law.""
Several Supreme Court Justices expressed similar positions as dicta in
recent cases." A few scholars supported Justice Barak's position and
predicted that he will eventually succeed in forwarding his broad
interpretation of the Basic Law."'
Matters of rand state are already partially resolved in a
constitutional framework. As a practical matter, one should wonder
whether there is a point in discussing the desirability of including
matters of religion and state in a constitutional framework when it
102. AHARON BARAK, III INTERPRETATION IN LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 416 (1994). [in Hebrew] [hereinafter BARAK, INTERPRETATION].
103. Aharon Barak, Zechuyot Adam Muganot: HaHekef ve-HaHagbalot
[Protected Human Rights: Scope and Limitations], 1 LAw & GOV'T IN ISR. 253,
256-61 (1992- 93). In his Judicial capacity Chief Justice Barak expressed this position
merely with regard to equality (Danilowits 48(5) P.D. 749, 760)-arguing that the
concept of human dignity should be read to include the right to equality-but
avoided suggesting the inclusion of freedom of religion although the case at hand
would have allowed such an argument (See, e.g., Mening v. Minister of the Interior,
47(3) P.D. 282, 286 (1993); Jabarin v. Minister of Education, 48(5) P.D. 199, 203
(1994). But cf Shavit v. Hevra Kadisha Gachsha Rishon leZion, H.C. 6024/97
(unpublished)).
104. This pattern is especially noticeable with respect to the right tD equality. See,
e.g., Justice Theodore Or in Hopert v. Yad vaShem, 48(3) P.D. 353, 362 (1994), and
Nusseiba v. Finance Minister (unreported decision in H.C. 5091191); Sustice Matsa in
Women Network v. Minister of Transport 48(5) P.D. 501,522 & 526 (1994), Miller v.
Minister of Defense, 49(4) P.D. 94, 110 (1995). But cf. Justice Iizhak Zamir in
Women Network, id. at 535 and Justice Dahlia Dorner in Miler id., at 131-32.
105. See David Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini
Revolution in Israeli Constitutional Law?, 26 ISR. L. REv. 238, 246 (1992); David
Kretzmer, The New basic Laws on Human Rights: a Mini-revolution in Israeli
Constitutional Law?, 14/2 NETHERLANDS Q. HuMi. RTS., 173, 177-78 (1996); Barak-
Erez, supra note 58, at 334-35. A 1997 article examined the likelihood of the
adoption of the broad interpretation based on views expressed by Supreme Court
Justices in their opinions, and concluded that the forces seem even. See, Hillel
Sommer, HaZechuyot HaBilti-Menuyot-al Heikefa shel haMahapecha haChukatit
[The Non-Enumerated Rights: on the Scope of the Constitutional Revolution] 28
MISHPATIM 257,337-39 (1997).
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seems already to be included. It seems that, notwithstanding the
fundamental changes that took place in Israel's constitutional order,
such an inquiry is still relevant.
As explained earlier, Israel has not concluded the process of
constitutional change. The possibility that the Supreme Court mill
interpret Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty to include freedom
of religion and equality is still mere speculation. It seems doubtful
that the Court will follow such an interpretive course because its
credibility as an impartial arbitrator might be called into question.t
As explained earlier, the power of judicial review that the Supreme
Court assumed, based on its interpretation of the two new basic laws,
is still opposed by Orthodox politicians. In fact, this opposition is also
shared by several scholars who oppose generally any constitutional
strategy in Israel. Some of the opponents of a constitutional strategy
contend that the new developments are reversible."' Others hold that
even if there is no way to turn the clock back, there is no reason to
106. Several court decisions in the past two years could be interpreted as
indicators of judicial restraint. This new judicial restraint could serve the case of
Alian Pessaro. Pessaro, a Spiritualist from Brazil, arrived in Israel as a tourist, %%as
converted to Judaism by the Bet Din (religious court) of the Council of Progressive
Rabbis in Israel-the Israeli counterpart of the American Jewvish Reform stream-
and married a Jew by the name of Goldstein. Shortly thereafter she applied to the
Ministry of the Interior to receive a citizenship under the Law of Return. 'When her
application was denied she appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court declared the
Ministry of Interior's criteria for recognizing conversions to Judaism in Israel (and
consequently granting citizenship status by the Law of Return) as null and void. This
finding should have resulted in the petition being upheld and an order to grant Mrs.
Pessaro an Oleh visa. The Court stopped short of doing so. Realizing that political
implications of the case touch upon one of the most sensitive internal conflicts in
Israeli politics, the Court did not order the ministry to register the petitioner as a Jew.
The Court reasoned cautiously, stating inter alia that the Knesset should be allowed
to set the standards for recognizing conversions in this area. Pessaro Goldstein 49(4)
P.D. 661. It should be noted, however, that on December 28, 1998, the chief judge of
the Jerusalem District Court took the 'next step' and ordered the Ministry of the
Interior to register as Jews some 23 immigrants who converted either in Israel or
abroad under non-Orthodox instruction. Gigi v. Minister of the Interior, 5757(3)
P.M. 454 (1998). In addition to restrained decision-making, Chief Justice Barak has
recently taken extrajudicial steps that can be interpreted as attempts to gain the
confidence of the Ultra-Orthodox community.
107. For example, Moshe Landau, retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
recently called upon the Knesset to enact in explicit language a law den)ing the
Supreme Court the power of judicial review. Justice Landau was for years among the
strongest opponents to Judicial review in the domain of human rights (although he
supported judicial review in structural matters) in Israel. See Moshe Landau, Hukah
K'Hok Elyon L 'Medinat Yisrael? [A Constitution as a Supreme Law of the State?J, 27
HAPRAKrr 30 (1972); Moshe Landau, Matan Hukah LeYisrael BeDerecl Psikat Bcit
HaMishpat, 3 MtSHPAT uMmISHAL 697 (1996).
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help turn the hands forward by extending constitutional documents."'
Even if it is true, as many observers predict, that these objections
cannot stop constitutional progress, they can nonetheless hinder the
public discussion required to achieve agreement on the constitutional
directives. In order to convince opponents to waive their objections
and help conclude the constitutional change successfully, it is
necessary to discuss their concerns and search for plausible arguments
in favor of including matters of religion and state in the constitutional
framework.
C. The Traditional Argument Against Constitutionalism
The concerns of the Orthodoxy over the constitutionalization of
the Israeli system are occasionally labled "sectarian" by politicians
and scholars holding divergent or opposite views. The truth,
however, is that such concerns, whether raised by the Orthodoxy or
others, are at the heart of constitutional philosophy. Describing these
traditional philosophical concerns will illustrate the sincerity and
moral weight of the specific Orthodox concerns.
The basic normative argument against constitutionalism is
known as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty."1 Judicial review, one
of the basic premises of constitutionalism, constitutes control of an
elected majority by an unrepresentative minority. Such a political
order, it is argued, cannot be accepted in a democratic system whose
basic premise is majority rule."' The problem of judicial review can be
presented in two ways: the problem of judicial review or the problem
of judicial review. By the first approach, the court implements its own
108. As a matter of fact, one plausible reason to the "imperialistic" interpretive
approach of Chief Justice Barak might be that he predicts that no further basic laws
or additions to the existing basic laws will be enacted in the near future, so he tries to
include as many rights as he can in the existing text. See, Sommer, svpra note 105, at
332-34.
109. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS, 16-17 (1962). See generally PAUL W. KAHN,
LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY (1992). For a recent argument against constitutionalism,
based on the conflict between constitutionalism and democratic deciion-making, see
Jeremy Waldron, Precommitment and Disagreement, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 271, (Lawrence A. Alexander, ed., 1998).
110. It should be noted, however, that direct majority rule can not be achieved in
modem democracies. Instead a system was developed in which "public policies are
made, on a majority basis, by representatives subject to effective popular control at
periodic elections which are conducted on the principle of political equality and
under general conditions of political freedom." HENRY B. MAYO, AN INTRODUCTION
TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 70 (1960).
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values versus the values of the majori y of the people-either the
present majority or the past. By the second approach, the court
favors the former majority of people by implementing their values
over those of the present majority."' The second approach does not
really question the legitimacy of the judiciary's role in interpreting
and enforcing constitutional norms, but rather questions the
legitimacy of the constitutional order as a whole, as an order that
assumes the creation of a hierarchy of laws defended by the judicial
branch.'2
A priori, the countermajoritarian problem can be resolved in two
ways. The first way, suggested by Alexander Bickel, is to find
majoritarian support for judicial review. The second way, suggested
by John Hart Ely," is to find a way to remove from judical review any
substantive or normative character. Bickel highlights the difference
between the influenced legislature and the insulated judiciary as a
justification for choosing the judiciary as the supreme branch. He
contends that competition exists between short-term interests, and
values considered to be of more general or permanent importance.
Bickel claims that these long-term values are likely to be lost in the
competition among interest groups which characterizes ordinary
politics. In his opinion, the Judiciary is the institution best suited to
serve as the guardian of such values because it is relatively insulated
from the influence of interest groups.
At first glance, Bickel's response seems to miss the point. If one
admits that the Judiciary makes value choices when it engages in
judicial review, then what entities these policies preferential
treatment over those made by overtly political institutions of
111. For a critique of Judicial Review on this basis, see David Chang, A Critique of
Judicial Supremacy, 36 Vn.L. L. REv. 281 (1991).
112. Of these two variations of the counter-majoritarian problem. the opponents
of a Constitutionalism in Israel, during the formative years of the state, relied more
often on the second variation. They shaped this argument in a moderate and unique
Israeli manner, as a reason to delay the enactment of a constitution rather than to
avoid it altogether. A claim was made that the then-existing Israeli constituencies
constituted merely a minority of the Jewish people. Hence, it v as claimed. such
minority had no right to preempt major decisions for the majority of Je%%ish people
yet to come. Such an argument was made by several MK in the debate that took
place in the Knesset e.g. by Bar-Rav-Hai (Mapai), THE STATE'S CONSTITUTION (an
official publication, issued in 1952, which compiled the 1950 constitutional debate),
13-14; Loewenstein (Religious United Front), id. at 28-29; Norok (RUF). id. at 93.
and was even referred to David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel, and its
leader for many years. See also Gavison, supra note 61, at 135.
113. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (19S0).
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government? Perhaps another assumption, which better meets the
challenge, underlies Bickel's response. Bickel assumes that the
court's decisions are consistent with the opinion of the present
majority. He claims that "the stability of the American Republic is
due in large part.., to a moral unity. This unity makes possible a
society that accepts its principles from on high, without fighting about
them., 114 Bickel believes that the U.S. Supreme Court is not counter-
majoritarian because it applies the "enduring values of society,"115 by
representing the popular understanding of these values. The major
weakness of Bickel's suggestion is that it is based on a contingent
argument. There is no inherent guarantee that the judiciary in any
given legal system will reflect the popular understanding, and it is also
not clear how that popular understanding can be tracked in any given
case.
Ely suggests a process-based model of judicial review as a means
for solving the counter-majoritarian problem. He believes that while
the legislature should decide normative issues, the court should guard
them from corruption. Stated another way, Ely claims that the
solution to the countermajoritarian problem can be found in judicial
abstention from applying substantive values, thereby narrowing the
scope of judicial intervention to the protection of fair process. The
major problem with Ely's suggestion, however, is that his assumption
that a value-neutral judical review is possible can be contested. One
may reasonably assume that the court inevitably will have to decide
substantive questions, while amending the fallacies of the political
process."6
D. Plausible Arguments for Constitutionalism
In the absence of a sufficient direct solution to the counter-
majoritarian problem, another response to that problem could be to
simply accept the existence of the tension between the will of the
majority and the constitution, yet justify it by the advantages achieved
by maintaining a constitutional order. Constitutional theoreticians
struggle to provide strong arguments in support of adopting a
constitutional strategy to balance the disadvantages of counter-
114. Bickel, supra note 109, at 30.
115. Id. at26.
116. See Kahn, supra note 109, at 147-51; See also Lawrence H. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L. J 1063
(1980).
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majoritarianism 7 One such argument is that a constitution can help a
political community "establish... its basic institutions, institutional
arrangements, and practices, so that an ordinary politics might then
begin... to operate." ' That is, a constitution enables the community
to set the rules by which political discussion will occur, thereby
freeing the participants to conduct their discussion more easily.
Second, numerous constitutionally entrenched provisions are
instrumental in protecting the democratic process. It is common, for
example, to consider provisions such as freedom of speech and the
right to vote as guardians of democracy."" Third, a constitutional
limit on majoritarian rule can help amend one major shortcoming of
democracy-the possibility that the majority might try to exploit its
power and interfere with the fundamental rights of individuals and
minorities. Fourth, it is argued, a constitution can protect the
majority against those in power who might attempt to maintain and
perpetuate their power.
A fifth powerful argument in favor of adopting a constitutional
strategy, and the one that will be endorsed here, is the potential of a
constitution to function as a gag rule. As explained earlier, a
community might decide to "gag" itself from engaging in certain
disputes out of fear that a contest these issues may tear, or even
destroy, the bonds of the community. A constitution can, by
definition, serve as an effective gag rule. Provisions within the
constitutional framework take on a supreme and entrenched status,
and are thus excluded from the regular political arena. Indeed, a
constitution formally gags only the governmental branches
themselves, not the constituents. However, it is reasonable to predict
that issues within a constitutional framework will cease to occupy the
general public's attention. Constitutional strategy can be understood,
therefore, as a means to gag the entire society from engaging in
disputes over undesirable conflicts.
We described earlier the Israeli status quo doctrine as an
informal gag rule. This understanding of the status quo underlies one
117. See, eg., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTrrUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR
POLITICS? ch. 2 (1994) [hereinafter PERRY, THE CoNsTrrrION IN THE COURTS] Cass
Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L REv. 633,636-43 (1991).
118. PERRY, supra note 117, at 19. For further elaboration on the role of
constitutionalism in framing the constitutive rules of political institutions see
STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 163-64 (1995).
119. See, e-g., id. at 171.
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of the arguments in favor of its nullification. As the argument goes,
the controversy over matters of religion and state should not be
gagged any more because avoiding discussion over these issues is
potentially more dangerous than maintaining such discussion.
Against this background, then, the entrenchment of the principles
that govern matters of religion and state in a constitution would be a
bad idea, because it would simply substitute one gag rule for another.
A constitution would serve as an even more powerful gag rule than
the status quo doctrine. As explained earlier, the status quo served as
an informal and flexible gag rule, which enabled some friction in
times of crisis. A constitution, by contrast, is a formal and much more
rigid gag rule. One could conclude that if the Israeli society should
abandon the status quo strategy in order to encourage a meaningful
discussion over matters of religion and state, it should also reject the
constitutional strategy as the proper framework in which to include
these issues. This conclusion is false. In order to explain why, it is
necessary to take a closer look at the nature of gag rules and make a
few distinctions between different types of gag rules.
E. Constitution as a Gag Rule and the Adequacy of the Israeli Case
As he described the advantages of gag rules, Holmes
acknowledged that using the strategy of gag rules is not cost free. He
pointed to three potential disadvantages in using gag rules."" First,
limiting the legislative agenda will "inevitably trivialize public life and
drain it from human significance."' 121 As previously asserted, this
disadvantage serves as a major consideration in advocating that the
Israeli society should abandon the status quo in order to force its
public into a forum for collective soul searching. Second, while
deterring discussion about controversial issues, gag rules do not deter
decisions but actually dictate them. Moreover, the decisions that gag
rules dictate are seldom neutral solutions. For example, Holmes
interpreted the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade,"
respecting the legitimacy of abortions, as a decision to remove the
controversy over the legitimacy of abortion between pro-life and pro-
choice camps from the legislative agenda. That is, he interpreted it as
a decision to gag Congress. He acknowledged, however, that such a
120. HOLMEs, GAG RULES, supra note 33, at 56.
121d.
122. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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decision affirmed the pro-choice stance.' Although presented as
decisions not to decide, gag rules actually dictate implicit decisions on
the merits by "implicitly support[ing] one policy and undermin[ing]
alternatives." 124 The third disadvantage of gag rules, according to
Holmes, is the fact that "denying legitimate expression to deeply felt
beliefs" might eventually engender a revolutionary explosion.12
With such heavy attendant costs, under what circumstances can
gag rules practically succeed? Unfortunately, on this point Holmes
"gagged" himself and did not elaborateY One way to identify an
initial response to this question is to check whether the costs of gag
rules vary between different types of gag rules. Presumably, when the
costs of a gag rule are lower, its prospects for success are better. It
seems that certain gag rules are less disadvantageous than others.
Holmes made several distinctions between types of gag rules.'" One
distinction, which is most instrumental to the purpose of this
discussion, although mentioned by Holmes merely in a footnote, is
between gag rules that postpone or bury a discussion and gag rules
that close a discussionY
Holmes defined gag rules as purposive and tactically justified
methods for issue suppression, namely, as methods to avoid
discussion of certain questions by suppressing the discussion
temporarily or burying it forever. However, gag rules do not always
have to suppress discussion in order to avoid destructive outcomes.
In certain cases, gag rules can also minimize the potential danger
attached to maintaining a discussion over controversial issues by
confining the discussion to a limited period of time and 'closing' the
issue afterwards. The difference between 'postponing' or 'burying'
and 'closing' gag rules is fundamental. Postponing or burying gag
rules not only suppress discussion over the relevant issue, but also
deny the competing groups the ability to reach voluntary agreements.
Unable to maintain a discussion, they are forced to accept the existing
state of affairs as a default, or to leave the decision to another body.
Closure gag rules, in contrast, do not deny the sides of the
123. Another example brought by Holmes is the controversy over slavery. He
claims that the congressional gag rules over this subject during the 1830i and 184Us
were much friendlier to slaveholders than to abolitionists.
124.Holmes, Gag Rules, supra note 33, at 56.
125.d
126. Id. at 58.
127. Id. at 25-26.
128. Id. at 26 n.10.
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controversy the chance to reach a resolution, but merely restrict the
period of time they can dedicate to such a resolution process.
Since closure gag rules do not prevent public discussion over the
gagged issue, they carry less severe costs than those of
postponing/burying gag rules, in respect to each of the three principle
disadvantages related to gag rules presented above. First, permitting
the sides to the dispute to engage in a discussion, even if for a limited
period of time, keeps the public arena as the stage for substantive
discussion over important issues. Second, the final resolution may
result from intentional decision-making, not abstention from such
decision-making. In such a case, any tendencies in resolution to lean
toward one side would not result from simply freezing the existing
situation. Restricting the time for discussion may, as experience
teaches us, even enhance a prompt and successful resolution. Third,
by enabling people to express themselves and influence the outcomes,
we minimize the danger of accumulating frustration. Each side has a
chance to present its argument and influence the decision-making
process. It therefore decreases the probability that any side will
consider the results unacceptable.
The status quo is a gag rule of the first type. It did not result
from meaningful (albeit restricted) discussion, but rather abstention
from such discussion. The potential controversy over matters of
religion and state was buried before the participants could engage in a
meaningful discussion and reach a resolution. It is not claimed here
that it was a historic mistake to adopt the status quo, as some
observers claim. Retrospectively, there is a strong support for the
claim that at the establishment of the state, a resolution was so far
from being achieved that it was not worthwhile to engage in a
resolution process. 9 There is also some validity to the claim that
other issues were much more urgent, and that the Israeli agenda
could not afford the time for even a short period of discussion.
However, as time passed, the initial disadvantages of that burying gag
rule began to outweigh its advantages.
129. See generally, Philippa Strum, Women and the Politics of Religion in Israel, 11
HuM. RTS. Q. 483, 488 (1989). Strum concludes, based on numerous interviews that,
"Israeli historians, political analysts, and statepersons are still divided over the
question of whether the Orthodox would have backed down had Ben-Gurion made
the writing of a constitution a no-compromise issue; whether a confrontation would
have destroyed the state; or whether avoiding a fight with the Orthodox meant that
society could be more secular than it would have been under any reachable
compromise."
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Current Israeli society must entertain meaningful public
discussion over issues of religion and state. The status quo doctrine,
as a postponing gag rule, should be nullified. However, if a resolution
is achieved, it would be a grave mistake to leave it in the regular
political arena. This will leave the resolution vulnerable to political
pressures, which will most likely resume once the initial "grace
period" and cooperation lapse.
The structure of the Israeli political system enhances the
possibility of revival of the controversy. It is a multiparty system in
which several parties owe their political existence to their functioning
as repreof interest groups. Several parties concentrate, as an interest
group, on matters of religion and state: religious parties on one side,
and at least two parties with a strong secular agenda on the other.
These parties will lose much of their attraction if the issue is resolved.
In order to avoid endless dispute, on the one hand, and extend the
chances of achieving a consensual, workable formula on the other, the
time for open discussion of issues of religion and state must be
limited. Such a goal may be achieved by maintaining a constitutional
convention-type of discussion, detached from routine politics," ' and
by including its results in a constitutional framework that will prevent
endless political bargaining over these issues.
F. Israeli Constitutional Change is Headed in the Wrong Direction
As already explained, Israel has undergone partial constitutional
change in the past several years. One who thinks, as does the author,
that constitutionalism is a good idea, that a constitution may function
as a stabilizing gag rule, could conclude that the Israeli constitutional
change should be welcomed. However, it should not be endorsed, at
least not unless certain fundamental changes are made. Absent these
changes the new Israeli constitution would operate as a poorer gag
rule than the old one.
Three distinctions that Holmes made between different types of
gag rules help explain why. The first distinction, discussed above,
stands between postponing and closing gag rules; the second, between
autonomous and heteronomous gag rules; and the third, between gag
rules that silence only a certain branch or level of government and
gag rules that silence all branches and levels of government.
130. See Elster, supra note 60, at 395 ("To reduce the scope for institutional
interest, constitutions ought to be written by specially convened assemblies and not
by bodies that also serve as ordinary legislatures.")
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1. TheTwo New Basic Laws Are Not Closing Gag Rules
The two new Basic Laws adopted in March 1992 created,
according to the interpretation of the Israeli Supreme Court, a
"constitutional revolution," gagging the legislature and the
government from handling several issues-including matters that
were previously included in the status quo-in regular politics.
Neither an historic moment nor meaningful public discussion
preceded the enactment of these laws."' How then was t:his initiative
fulfilled successfully after forty-four years of failure?
The response, as simplistic as it may sound, is that the fulfillment
resulted from a combination of two factors. First, a few proponents
of a bill of rights took advantage of the ignorance of their opponents,
who were unaware of the far-reaching potential outcomes of these
laws." The deputy attorney general at the time, who participated in
the entire process of adopting the Basic Laws, testified that the
common understanding among many MKs who participated in the
vote over the draft Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was that
these laws would not alter the status quo and that the Supreme Court
would not gain the power of judical review. 3 The low participation
in the final vote for the adoption of the new Basic Laws is proof that
the Knesset lacked awareness of its extreme importance and
revolutionary impact. In the vote for Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, 54 members of the Knesset participated-46% of the total
membership of this house-with 32 supporting, 21 opposing and one
abstaining. In the final vote over Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation
23 members of the Knesset participated, with no opposition and no
abstentions. These Basic Laws could not gain, however, the desired
constitutional status without the support of the Supreme Court. The
initiative of the Knesset was met by an eager Supreme Court that
131. For an assessment similar to the one mentioned in the text see Heshin J. in
United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. 49(4) P.D. 221,521. But cf. Barak-Erez, supra note 58, at
351-52, striving unconvincingly in my opinion, to find historical moments.
132. See Claude Klein, Basic Law Human Dignity and Liberty-Hrst Normative
Evaluation, 1 HAMICHLALA LEMINHAL 123 (1993) [in Hebrew] (The enactment of
these two basic laws "undoubtedly involved sophisticated exploitation of the 'end of
season' atmosphere that prevails in the last days of the Knesset's term. Already in
the past several MKs succeeded in passing controversial bills in that interim period;
however, this time they undoubtedly had an unprecedented success." The translation
is mine-g.s.).
133. Judith Karp, Hok Yesod Kevod HaAdam VeHeiruto-Biografla shel
Ma'avakei Koah [Basic Law Human Dignity and Liberty-A Biography of Power
Struggles], 1 LAW & GOV'T IN ISR. 323 (1992-93).
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rushed to put a constitutional stamp on these bills. It was only under
the interpretation of the Supreme Court that the new Basic Laws
gained clearly constitutional status, creating a new gag rule.
As I explained earlier, for a gag rule to succeed it should be a
closure gag rule. The two new Basic Laws cannot be described as a
closing gag rule. Their creation was neither the fruit of a broad
consensus nor a result of a fully aware negotiation process. These new
Basic Laws viewed as gag rules are not better than the old gag rule
they may potentially replace.
2. The Two Basic Laws Are Heteronomous Gag Rules
Autonomous (self-imposed) gag rules differ from heteronomous
(imposed by others) gag rules in the costs that they bear.
Autonomous gag rules have an obvious advantage over
heteronomous gag rules. A self-imposed silence %vill likely prove
more acceptable than a silence imposed by others. The status quo, as
vague and incomplete as it is, was an autonomous gag rule. The two
new basic laws as interpreted by the Supreme Court are, as strange as
it may sound, a heteronomous gag rule. As explained, the legislative
history of these laws shows that most MKs that did attend the vote on
these laws were not aware of their far-reaching consequences. Many
of them definitely did not realize that at stake was the empowerment
of the Supreme Court to review primary legislation. They did not
realize that by voting in favor of these laws they would gag
themselves from future deliberation in regular politics over the
subjects included in these laws."' The Israeli legislature was gagged,
therefore, not as a result of an autonomous voluntary decision but as
a consequence of the Supreme Court's creative interpretation.
3. The Two Basic Laws Are Gag Rules That Silence the Political
Branches But Not the Judiciary
Gag rules that silence all branches and levels of government have
an advantage over gag rules that remove the issue from the
134. This is especially correct with respect to Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, which does not include an entrenchment provision. This was also the
common understanding among scholars subsequent to the adoption of these laws.
See, eg., EHUD SPRINZAK & LARRY DIAMOND, Introduction, in ISRAELI DEMOCRCY
UNDER STRESS, 20 n. 1 (Sprinzak & Diamond eds., 1993) ("Although the law... was
adopted as a basic law, in contrast to the new Basic Law Freedom of Occupation, it
was not 'entrenched' .... Thus, although it is called a 'basic law', it does not include
the element that grants this appellation practical meaning.")
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jurisdiction of the political branches only. In fact, the
countermajoritarian difficulty discussed earlier is actually an
argument against a constitutional strategy that functions as a selective
gag rule. This countermajoritarian difficulty, in its first construction,
suggests that the court implements its own values at the expense of
the values of the majority, either present or past. It derives from the
fact that enforcing constitutional directives involves interpretation.
The claim is that the judiciary does not merely enforce precise
directives as adopted by a past majority; rather, it injects its own
values in a way that does not resemble the intention of the majority
that gagged itself. In other words, the judiciary is accused of gagging
the political branches without gagging itself.
The counter-majoritarian difficulty attacks the constitutional
strategy on a normative basis. However, this assertion, if correct,
makes this type of a gag rule also less likely to work as a practical
matter. It is unlikely that a democratic majority will zgree to gag
itself on important issues knowing that the judicial branch will be
exempt from this gag rule.
The original goal of the status quo was to gag all government
branches. Indeed, this intention was only partially successful since
the Supreme Court took the liberty to review secondary legislation
and governmental actions that crystallized the status quo, and to
freely interpret primary legislation, when it considered these acts,
regulations, or laws, to contradict fundamental principles. However,
as described above, the court generally refrained from substantively
altering the status quo. This assertion no longer proves correct since
the two new Basic Laws were enacted. These Basic Laws are phrased
in a loose manner, almost inviting the Supreme Court to creatively
shape them. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court gladly accepts such
invitation. The two Basic Laws, as they have been and likely will
continue to be interpreted by the Supreme Court, are actually gag
rules that silence the political branches but empower the court to
continue shaping Israeli norms in many issues, including matters of
religion and state.
For example, while interpreting the concept of 'human dignity,'
which appears in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, Chief
Justice Barak dismissed originalism as an interpretive method., The
interpretive method that he advocated was the "objective purpose of
135. BARAK, INTERPRETATION, supra note 102, at 149ff.
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the legislation."'' 6 He contended that the objective meaning of this
concept must include, "all those human rights that have a close
substantive connection to humdignity and liberty according to
prevailing concepts among the enlightened public in Israel."' The
objective purpose of legislation is therefore a reflection of "the views
of the enlightened population in whose midst he [the judge] sits." In
the name of the "enlightened" population in Israel, Justice Barak will
interpret 'human dignity' to include freedom of religion and equality,
two norms that were intentionally excluded by the legislature from
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty." The fact that the Supreme
Court claims the power of judicial review and the fact that it also
takes freedom to determine the principles included in the
constitutional framework, make the two new Basic Laws good
candidates for becoming bad gag rules.
4. Conclusion
The new Israeli Basic Laws are burying and heteronomous gag
rules that silence the political branches but not the judiciary. As such,
they do not offer a better solution to conflicts over issues of religion
and state than the old status quo doctrine. On the contrary, they
potentially make things more complicated than they had been. They
may muffle regular political debate on issues of religion and state.
But since no meaningful resolution preceded this silence, since it was
the judiciary, rather than the public, that decided to impose this
silence, and since it silences the political governmental branches but
not the judiciary, the new Basic Laws are almost bound to fail. In the
past several years, since the enactment of the Basic Laws and
subsequent judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court, ultra-
Orthodox circles have mounted attacks against the Supreme Court
and its Chief Justice.' Although these attacks should be condemned
136. For a short article discussing Chief Justice Barak's constitutional
interpretation theory see Aharon Barak, Hermeneutics and Constitutional
Interpretation, 14 CARDOzo L. REV. 767 (1993).
137. BARAK, INTERPRETATION, supra note 102, at 416; Vickselbaum v. Minister of
Defense, 47(2) P.D. 812,827.
138. AHARON BARAK, SHIKULDAATSHIPuri [Judicial Discretion] 126,131.
139. Some of the Supreme Court Justices have sought, in a number of decisions, to
include several 'missing' rights under the umbrella of human dignity. See, e.g., Re'em
Engineers LTD. V. Municipality of Nazareth Elite, 47(5) P.D. 189,201 (1992); Dayan
v. Commander of Jerusalem Police, 48(2) P.D. 456, 468 (1993); and cases cited supra
notes 103-104.
140. For example, Shas spiritual leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef villified the High
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normatively because they endanger the deepest foundations of the
democratic regime in Israel, 4' they should nonetheless be understood
to result from growing frustration among the Orthodox community
that it must directly adapt to any vital changes in the status quo
doctrine that the Supreme Court engineers.42 Not surprisingly, it has
been suggested recently that Israel will amend its mechanism for
selecting and nominating Supreme Court Justices, making the process
more politicized and more closely resemble the American system."'
G. What is Required for a Constitution to Serve as a Successful Gag
Rule
So far I have attempted to show why the two new Basic Laws are
almost bound to fail. I believe, however, that the problem with these
Basic Laws is not inherent in a constitutional order per se. As I
Court Justices. Yosef said that all the Justices of the Supreme Court are evil and
desecraters of the Sabbath, and all the suffering of this world came from them. His
son, Rabbi David Yosef, characterized Supreme Court Chief Justice Aharon Barak
as a Jew-hater and derided the courts as antisemitic. Speaking at a press conference
while announcing a mass demonstration against the Supreme Court, former haredi
MKs Menahem Porush and Moshe Gafni spoke of judicial dictatorship and warned
that the religious public would rebel if the High Court continued with its
"antisemitic" decisions. Batsheva Tsur, Weizman pleads to cancel rally, JERUSALEM
POST, February 12, 1999; Haim Shapiro, Haredi Leader: High Court Rulings Will
Cause a Revolt, JERUSALEM POST, February 10, 1999.
141. For a while, the attacks on the Supreme Court were so serious that the Israeli
security authorities attached bodyguards to Chief Justice Barak to ensure his
security.
142. Hofnung, supra note 5, at 602. As Hofnung observes, "the civil judicial
system is now viewed by a considerable portion of the Israeli population as an active
participant in a political debate, an actor identified with the secular-liberal segment
of Israeli society."
In a pamphlet distributed at a rally in Jerusalem against the Supreme Court on
February 14, 1999, Manof, the Center for Haredi Information, listed the rulings of the
Court in the past year which it characterized as anti-haredi. They include the
following: A ruling against withdrawing a kashrut certificate from a hall which has a
Christmas tree; against the deferment of yeshiva students from military service; for
secular burial; in favor of including Reform and Conservative representatives on
religious councils; to force Religious Affairs Minister to sign appointments of Reform
and Conservative members to the religious councils; to return a girl to a secular
school after her father withdrew her; a neutral stand on whether one must wear a
kippa (Yarmulke) in a rabbinical court; for registering a Reform conversion. The
center also listed a series of court decisions negating the rulings of rabbinical courts
in matters of marriage and divorce, division of property, and custody. Haim Shapiro,
A List of Haredi Grievances, JERUSALEM PoST, February 12,1999.
143. For a detailed description of the current judicial selection procedure see
Edelman supra note 93, at 34-35. For a call for change see Mordechai Haller, The
Court That Packed Itself, 8 AzURE 64(1999).
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explained earlier, a constitutional strategy can serve as a gag rule. I
also argued that in order for a gag rule to succeed, it needs to be
adopted and formulated to serve as a closure, to be autonomous, and
to silence all governmental branches. Can a constitution fulfill these
requirements?
Of the three foregoing conditions for a successful gag rule the
requirement that it silence all governmental branches seems the
hardest for a constitution to fulfill. As I explained, the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, in its first construction, argues that the court
implements its own values at the expense of the values of the majority
of the people. I also explained that no sufficient direct solution to the
counter-majoritarian problem was offered. Thus a common response
is to acknowledge the problem while justifying the constitutional
order by presenting the advantages maintaining such an order will
achieve. This solution cannot suffice here because the current
formulation characterizes the counter-majoritarian difficulty as a
problem that would prevent a constitution from providing the very
advantage that makes such a constitution worthwhile.
So, is a constitution bound to fail? I believe not. Although a
completely successful method for silencing the judiciary does not
exist, there are several ways to minimize its influence. I will describe
four methods that might provide a partial solution by limiting the
monopoly of the judiciary: the first two methods limit the monopoly
of the judiciary by restricting its creative interpretive power, and the
other two limit the monopoly of the judiciary by extending the
supervisory power of the political branches.
The first way is to adopt an interpretative method, such as
'originalism', which will provide the court with a conclusive and
objective response to constitutional questions and thus obviate the
need for subjective interpretation.'" Indeed, this claim to objectivity is
144. There are some variations among originalist theories. However, they have in
common a belief that the materials relevant to determining the constitution's
meaning are limited to the text, structure and historical context of the document. As
such, originalism has been characterized as a relatively passive method of
interpretation, which conceives the constitution as embodying meaning that the
interpreter seeks to find. Defenses of originalism have been closely related to the
concern for constrained judicial role. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIII. L. REv. 849, 864 (1989) ([Olriginalism "establishes a historical
criterion that is conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge
himself.") Among leading originalists are Robert Bork and Raoul Berger. See, e.g.,
ROBERT BORK, THE TEMIPTING OF AmERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDtL ION OF THE
LAW (1990); Raoul Berger, Original Iztent: The Rage of Hans Baade, 71 N.C.L. REv.
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limited and incomplete. Even the adherents of originalism admit
"there is often more than one plausible conclusion to the inquiry into
the original meaning of a constitutional provision. ''4. Therefore,
some constitutional interpretive debates cannot be resolved in a
totally objective manner. Even if proper theories of :interpretation
cannot avoid the problem of subjectivity, however, they can
nonetheless minimize it.
146
A second way to minimize the problem of subjectivity is to
articulate constitutional documents in clear and detailed language
that minimizes the need for interpretive work.147  The U.S.
Constitution's Bill of Rights, for example, is short and concise. It is
no wonder, then, that one of the fiercest debates in American modern
Constitutionalism is over the role of the judiciary in interpreting and
enforcing the constitution, and that the call for judicial restraint is so
commonly expressed in the U.S.."4 Modem constitutions, such as that
of the Federal Republic of Germany or Canada, are clearer and more
detailed. These constitutions require much less interpretive work
than the American constitution.
A third way to limit the monopoly of the judiciary in interpreting
the constitution is to limit the terms of judges empowered to interpret
1151 (1993).
145. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS, supra note 117, at 56. Perry
dedicates chapters 4 & 5 of this book to support the proposition that "Originalism
Does Not Entail Minimalism."
146. Thus, even supporters of nonoriginalism, such as Michael Perry (in his early
works), have conceded that originalism provides a "better way of keeping faith" with
the aspiration to electorally accountable policymaking. See M CHAEL PERRY,
MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW 168 (1988).
147. For similar view see Michael J. Perry, What Is "the Constitution"? (and Other
Fundamental Questions), in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 109, at 99, 131 ("I am inclined to agree ... that constitution-makers should
be cautious about including indeterminate norms in a constitution.... .") This second
method must, however, be balanced with the opposite need to articulate constitutions
in loose terms in order to allow future developments for unforeseen situations or as a
compromise between competing positions. See, e.g., H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 129-30 (1961) (To achieve determinacy is sometimes "to secure a measure of
certainty or predictability at the cost of blindly prejudging what is to be done in a
range of future cases, about whose composition we are ignorant. We shall thus
succeed in settling in advance, but also in the dark, issues that can only reasonably be
settled when they arise and are identified."); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION
AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 60 (1995).
148. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 144; see also Scalia supra note 144. Justice Scalia
has exercised judicial restraint in many important cases since his nomination to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
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the constitution, as happens in Germany."' Such limits "empower the
present to exert more political influence over the Court than does life
tenure for Supreme Court justices." "
Finally, the fourth way to restrain the judiciary, which was briefly
discussed above," is to limit the privilege of the court by subjecting
its interpretations to political control. The Canadian Charter, for
example, adopted such a model in its notwithstanding clause; Israel
has amended Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation to include parallel
clause; and several American constitutional scholars support the
adoption of such a mechanism in the U.S." Indeed, the suggestion to
provide the legislature an overriding power bears some costs, as it will
clearly weaken the overall gagging effect of the constitution, given
our goal of gagging religion-state disputes from regular politics.
Nonetheless, if the only other available options are either to leave this
subject entirely to ordinary politics, or to vigorously gag the political
branches and allow the Supreme Court to act as the universal arbiter
of these issues, a moderate gag rule on all governmental branches is
still preferable.
IV. Conclusion
The status quo has effectively served Israel, for many years, as a
method to suppress, or at least de-politicize, serious controversies
over religious issues. In this essay I argued, however, that it is in the
best interest of the Israeli society, including the Orthodoxy, to open
the status quo for reevaluation. I presented several reasons in support
of this proposition.
First, Israeli priorities have been changing in the past several
years, making the maintenance of an open debate over the exact
149. The judges of the German Constitutional Court are appointed for a term of
twelve years and are ineligible for reappointment. Constitutional Court Act Section
4(1) (1971). For such a proposal respecting the U.S., see Gregg Easterbrook, Geritol
Justice:. Is the Supreme Court Senile? NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 19, 1991, at 17.
150. PERRY, THE CoNsTrruTboN IN THE COURTS, supra note 117, at 197.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 76-81.
152. See PERRY, THE CONSTrrUTION IN THE COURTS, supra note 117, at 197-201;
Paul C. Weiler, Rights and Judges in a Democracy" A New Canadian Version, 18 J. L.
REFORMi 51, 84 (1984) ("Any measure that could be navigated through all the
branches of the national legislative process ... might well be considered a more
sensible approach to the problem than would a verdict from a bare majority of five
on the Supreme Court"); Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and
Constitutional Accountabili, (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores). 105 HARV. L.
REV. 80, 124 (1991).
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relationship between religion and state an urgent need. With the
progress of the peace process, external issues are losing their urgency,
and societal focus turns to the internal arena. Unresolved internal
disagreements, and above all, the dispute over the proper relationship
between religion and state, are likely to become the real threat to the
country's stability. Also, the Jewish Israeli society faces an identity
crisis that might not be resolved absent a serious discussion leading to
meaningful conclusions with respect to the identity of the State of
Israel. Second, the Israeli legal and political systems have in the past
several years undergone changes that, in the long run, will prevent the
status quo from functioning further as a gag rule: the political
equilibrium that used to shield the status quo from major changes was
interrupted; and the Judiciary assumed extended powers which
enable it to act as arbiter in issues previously resolved through status
quo political mechanisms. Third, contrary to common opinion, public
discussion over matters of religion and state may serve to unify rather
than divide the already fractionalized Jewish Israeli society, and
thereby attain the major benefit commonly attributed to the status
quo.
One of the major obstacles to opening the status quo to
reevaluation is the concern of the Orthodox leadership that such
substantive reevaluation will include constitutional entrenchment of
the new arrangement. The source of Orthodox reluctance to support
a constitutional entrenchment is based on practical concerns. Their
concern is not so much that the initial constitutional product would
not reflect enough Jewish values and needs. The real concern is that
even if the constitution is initially shaped in a balanced manner, it is
likely that the Supreme Court will interpret the constitutional
directives freely, implement its own values, and use its power to
review key provisions of the status quo. Should such a scenario
materialize, the entrenched status of the constitution will make it
hard, if not impossible, to reverse Supreme Court ruling through the
political branches.
The fear of an intensive judicial interference with contested
issues, however, is not the purview of religious people alone.
Creative judicial interpretation of the constitution is a major concern
in constitutional philosophy, known as the counter-majoritarian
difficulty. It also cuts against one of the major benefits that a
constitution can potentially provide, social stability. Such a concern
should be and is expressed not only by religious people but also by a
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few impartial Israeli scholars.'
This practical concern is not unfounded. The Israeli Supreme
Court, under the leadership of the present Chief Justice, has not
exercised much self-restraint so far, and is not likely to do so in the
near future.' However, as I show, this concern is not inherent to the
153. See Ruth Gavison, Medina Yehudit VeDemocratit, Zeit Politit ldcokgia
Umishpat [A Jewish and Democratic State - Political Idcntity, Ideology and Law], 19
TEL Aviv U. L. REv. 631, 680 (1995); Ruth Gavison, haMahapccha haChkatit-
Teiur Metsiut oh Nevuah haMagshina et Atsma [The Constitutional Revoltion: a
Reality or a self-fulfilling Prophecy], 28 MiSHPATIm 21 (1997). Gavison is among rery
few Israeli legal scholars that dare to criticize the recent development led by the
Supreme Court. Among several normative and practical disadvantages of intensive
judicial interpretation, Gavison expresses a concern that whether the Court %% ill be
systematically biased in favor of one side, or not, its intense judicial intrusion will
corrode the impartial image of the court. This concern, which I only implied in the
text, is indeed very real. A key requirement for a working judicial system is the
notion of neutral and impartial judiciary. The impartial image of the judiciary is
instrumental in motivating people to handle their controversies in the court and in
convincing the losing party to accept the judge's ruling. Excessive judicial
interpretation and intervention might politicize this branch and harm its neutral
image. This argument is especially convincing in Israel. where the public at large
does not trust the political branches very much. For many years the Supreme Court
enjoyed popular respect and consensual status, and served as a unifying pot er. Once
the Court starts to perform judicial review over controversial issues it may lose this
status.
In a closed discussion group on the constitutional developments that was held
on March 16 1997, in the Israel Democracy Institute, under the presidium of Retired
Chief Justice Meir Shamger, Gavison said: "Had I been a religious person. I would
have said that the message that I hear from the Supreme Court is very disturbing...
the question in our context is, do we want to change the rules of the game? I believe
that the answer is that notwithstanding the important advantages of a constitutional
order.., it is a very bad idea to change the rules of the game." (On file with author,
the translation is mine. g.s.). Professor Gavison proposes to establish first a new
covenant over the controversial subject of religion and state and only then to
translate the agreement to a binding constitutional document. To the position of
Professor Gavison, of the need to slow dowvn the process until a social covenant is
achieved, joined Retired Deputy Chief Justice, Professor Menachem Elon, .%ho sat
on the religious seat in the Supreme Court for many years. Professor Elon also
related in the above-mentioned discussion to the fear of the religious camp the
Supreme Court's interpretive judicial activism, and the uncertainty respecting its
outcomes.
154. Throughout the past twenty years the Israeli Supreme Court has gradually
increased its capacity of intervention and review of the activity of government
branches. It revolutionized the law of standing and justiciability to such an extent
that almost anyone can now apply to the Court on constitutional matters. In
addition, it applied the substantive doctrine of reasonablencss to invalidate
administrative acts, even in sensitive political cases. As a result, Israel's legal culture
has witnessed in the past several years an extensive judicialization of politic,. For
more details see Shimon Shetreet, Standing and Justiciability, in P1 BLIc - LV.v iN
ISRAEL 265 (Itzhak Zamir & Allen Zysblat eds. 1996): Itzhak Zamir,
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constitutional strategy. If the measures proposed above are followed,
much of the problem will be eliminated, as they will linit the ability
of the Court to deviate, through interpretation, from the common
understanding of the constitutional directive. In this case, the big
advantage of constitutionalism, of which both Orthodox and non-
Orthodox Israeli Jews may enjoy, will be achieved.
Unreasonableness, Balance of Interests and Proportionality, in PUBLIC LAW IN
ISRAEL, id. at 327; Hofnung, supra note 5, at 590, 599-601; Menachem Mautner, The
Reasonableness of Politics, 5 THEORY & CITICISM 25 (1994) (in Hebrew); Martin
Edelman, The Judicialization of Politics in Israel, 15 INT'L POL. SCI. REv. 177 (1994):
Menachem Mautner, Yeridat haFormalizm veAliyat haArachim baMishpat haYisraeli
[The Decline of Fornalism and the Rise of Values in Israeli Law], 17 TEL Aviv U. L.
REv. 503 (1993).
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